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Abstract 
 
This thesis is an examination of physical pain in ancient tragedy, with the focus 
on three plays: Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound and Sophocles’ Philoctetes and 
Trachiniae. The study unfolds the layers of several conceptual systems in order 
get closer to the core—pain and its limits in tragedy. The first chapter aims to 
show that Aristotle’s model for the analysis of tragedy in his classificatory tract, 
the Poetics, centered on the ill-defined concept of mimesis, is an attempt to tame 
pain and clean tragedy of its inherent viscerality. The second chapter looks at the 
dualist solution advanced by Plato and Descartes, while showing that a discourse 
rooted in dualism alienates pain from tragedy. The third chapter provides axes of 
analysis for three tragedies where pain plays a central role by using the idea of 
pain as an experience of the limit and looking at the different ways in which pain 
splits the subject. The thesis also advances the idea that, for the most part, 
conceptual frames act as analgesic systems that obstruct the exposure to the 
experience of intensity in ancient tragedy. 
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Life is the nonrepresentable origin of representation. 
       Jacques Derrida
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Introduction: 
The main purpose of this thesis is to clean the slate for a fresher reading 
of tragedy through pain. This goal seems overly ambitious for a master’s thesis 
and the form of this project reflects the choices I had to make in order to 
accommodate and contain such a wide scope. The present thesis is also an 
attempt to find other means for the examination of ancient texts. I find that the 
most fitting methodology for this objective is discourse analysis. Through this 
methodology, as well as through several efforts carried out in this thesis of 
opening unconventional axes of analysis, I carry out this attempt, which is not 
one of reappropriating tragedy and affixing it to the field that I am affiliated to, 
but, rather, one of challenging a hegemonic frame of reference. The challenge of 
shifting the perspective of analysis in the specific case of the ancient corpus, 
which has long been under the administration of Classical Studies, is not only 
one of the rigour that the analysis of Greek and Latin texts necessitates, but 
also the challenge that the burden of proof places on one pleading for an 
alternative reception of ancient texts. Were this a project carried out by means 
of the traditional tools available to a classicist, the question of association to a 
field would not have been a pressing one. But then, of course, the project would 
have also been shaped differently, although still not devoid of theoretical 
challenges. As Wlad Godzich notes, “[t]here is no atheoretical approach to 
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literature; there are only more or less consciously held theoretical tenets.”1 
Since, however, this thesis is written within the field of Comparative Literature, 
it is important to clarify two issues: why discourse analysis is a method 
compatible with this field; and why is pain a suitable entry point into a 
nontraditional analysis of tragedy? 
This thesis does not proceed on the basis of a clear differentiation 
between theoretical texts and literature “proper.” It distinguishes, however, 
between different systems of conceptualization and tragic language. Philological 
analysis is usually the method of choice for the examination of ancient texts; a 
student in the department of Classics is usually trained, on one hand, in 
reading Greek and Latin and, on the other hand, in the textual analysis of the 
texts in the original language, with a focus on grammatical structures. In my 
experience, I found philological analysis to be a very useful tool, one that reveals 
the inner mechanisms and subtleties of texts, creating the conditions necessary 
for a familiarization with the language. Also, since this type of analysis 
functions primarily by isolating the text from its larger historical context, the 
result it that the classicist works primarily within the enclosed universe of the 
text, without taking into account the conceptual patterns that, many times, 
creep into his own analysis. Besides taking distance from this type of approach 
to textual analysis, this thesis engages in discourse analysis in order to 
                                                
1 Wlad Godzich, “Emergent Literature and Comparative Literature,” in The 
Comparative Perspective on Literature: Approaches to Theory and Practice, ed. Clayton 
Koelb and Susan Noakes (New York: Cornell University Press, 1988), 23.  
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challenge several conceptual patterns, such as Aristotelian categorization and 
dualism, which act as superstructures whenever notions of tragic language and 
corporeality are discussed. In an attempt to delineate the discipline of 
Comparative Literature, Godzich writes:  
In relation to disciplines, “field” refers to a parcel of the culturally 
constructed domain as it is subject to the operations of the apparatus of 
knowledge, whereas field (without quotation marks) is the enabling 
condition of cultural elaboration. At this juncture, I would like to put 
forward the following claim: the “field” of Comparative Literature is field. 
In other words, I take it that, within the prevalent organization of 
knowledge, it is incumbent upon comparatists to inquire into the 
relationship of culture to givenness, to its other.2 
As a comparatist, I am using discourse analysis to question the givenness that 
lays the foundation of a tradition of analysis of ancient texts. In this project I 
am only able to address the aforementioned conceptual systems that are part of 
this givenness, which is only the beginning of an inquiry related to tragedy. As a 
comparatist with Classical Studies training, I can both work with the Greek 
text and distinguish patterns in the reception of ancient texts that result in the 
appropriation of these texts by specific fields for purposes that are in line with 
their own agendas only. A return to textual analysis and a recontextualization 
of the texts after the deconstruction undertaken in this project will be 
undertaken in a subsequent project, if the alignment of future events will 
permit it. 
                                                
2 Godzich, Emergent Literature, 28.  
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 I choose to center this whole project on the notion of pain first of all 
because, as it will become apparent, it is a notion that cannot be encapsulated 
by available conceptual systems I am analyzing here in relation to tragedy. It is, 
therefore, a tool for the deconstruction I am undertaking through discourse 
analysis in alignment with the scope of the discipline of Comparative 
Literature. Secondly, through this project centered on pain I want to clarify 
several concerns I have, both intellectual and spiritual: the relation between 
pain as the limit of the world perceived through the senses, as well as the way 
the experience of intense pain breaks habits and patterns of comfort, while 
exposing one’s inherent helplessness. My interest in pain as a subject of study 
started a few years ago, during an intensive meditation retreat where I was 
practicing a type meditation called Vipassana, rooted in the Theravada 
Buddhist tradition. In this tradition, one is taught that the three marks of 
existence are impermanence (anicca), suffering (dukkha) and the non-self 
(anatta). Through the practice of Vipassana, the meditator works towards the 
comprehension of these three facts of existence and, by undoing the attachment 
to the body, the world and the false beliefs that generate suffering, he strives to 
“see things as they really are.”3 The constant observation of sensations in the 
body (which is the task of the Vipassana meditator) leads, through consistent 
practice, to non-reaction—a state of being distanced from the body. This is, in 
                                                
3 “The Three Basic Facts of Existence: I. Impermanence (Anicca).” Pref. by 
Nyanaponika Thera. Access to Insight, accessed September 7, 2015. 
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/various/wheel186.html 
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my experience, a peaceful state indeed, but it is also a state of remoteness from 
life. Based on my own experience, I argue that, for the beginner meditator in 
this tradition, peacefulness is a simulation rather than a state where insight is 
possible. The philosophy behind the Vipassana practice links all emotions and 
thoughts to sensations in the body, which can be empirically observed. The task, 
then, is to not react internally, but to remain throughout an observer of all 
sensations and the succession of emotions and thoughts. One aspect that I 
consider to be problematic in this outlook is the vilification of the sensations 
and, consequently, of the body. This, in Buddhism, does not lead to a projection 
of a soul outside of the body, as I will discuss in the second chapter of this thesis 
next to dualism, but to a deconstruction of reality and of the narratives related 
to self, personality, instincts, desires, thoughts, emotions, habits and behaviour. 
The freedom that detachment affords comes from the recognition of the basic 
principle of impermanence, followed by the non-identification with the 
aforementioned facts related to the self. Yet, this is problematic due to the a 
priori sentencing of suffering. Moreover, the deconstruction of the self that the 
Vipassana technique aims at heralds a constructed, serene death through a 
process that is sometimes irreversible. In my own meditation experience I found 
the sensations themselves to contain more genuineness than the Theravada 
Buddhists give them credit for. Descartes, in his Meditations, uses repeatedly 
descriptions of sensation when laying out his dualist argument. As I discovered 
in my own meditation practice, pain is the sensation that, when felt with certain 
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intensity, would dissolve all detachment, bringing the attention back not only to 
the body, but to that very limb or part of the body where it manifests. Based on 
this, I hold that, rather than subduing the world of sensations either through 
this meditation technique or through conceptualization, giving credence to the 
body and especially to this most insolent sensation, pain, would grant a glimpse 
into a different kind of truth, perhaps a visceral one. I dare use this personal 
experience for my inquiry here, while acknowledging the risk that, at times, the 
tone of this thesis might turn from academic to confessional. It is ironic that 
narcissism be exposed in an exercise against authority, but concealment would 
not aid discourse in any manner either. In what follows, I provide an overview 
of the main ideas underlying this project.  
This thesis comprises a study of three ancient tragedies centered on the 
notion of pain (Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, Sophocles’ Philoctetes and the 
Trachiniae) as delineated by the concept of the limit. The constitutional 
difficulty of such a project is given by the fact that, once articulated in these 
terms, the analysis of pain stalls, since the experience of the hermeneutist, as 
that of the spectator, is tuned with that of the sufferer: the imminence of pain 
arrests all discourse. In spite of this difficulty, pain constitutes a focus in tragic 
poetry and this alone is a valid reason for undertaking such a project. Pain is 
not simply inserted into tragedy; rather, it stands at its core. Fighting pain’s 
inherent inexpressibility, Aeschylus and Sophocles find ways of integrating it in 
tragedy and the result is that all tools of expression are tested and enriched. 
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Language finds new ways of expressing; the characters’ mythological traits are 
challenged, unveiling unforeseen nuances. Additionally, pain signals towards a 
viscerality or rawness inherent in tragedy. Out of the three tragic playwrights 
whose works are extant, Aeschylus and Sophocles are concerned with pain 
directly and the notion of viscerality, well intuited by Antonin Artaud, the 
avant-garde theatre theorist and performer. Artaud’s writings on theatre in the 
beginning of the twentieth century focus on the idea of destruction through 
suffering, pain, and the deconstruction of language and thought. His desire is to 
revitalize theatre and to shake its structure until both the artists and the public 
recognize a need to return to a ritualized, spiritual theatre. Artaud tries to bring 
back to theatre some of the rawness that the Ancient Greeks had access to and, 
in a way, he echoes those aspects in Greek theatre that have been long 
overlooked. Artaud emphasizes the need for his contemporaries to pay attention 
to a rawness of representation that he associates with ritualistic forms of 
theatre, such as Balinese and Greek theatre. However, Artaud lacks a 
theoretical apparatus and his writings only point towards his intentions 
regarding theatrical representation, but they do so with a pathos that both 
fascinates and provokes. 
I am choosing to leave out Euripides’ work out of this analysis because he 
seems to lack the rawness in expression that the other two playwrights retain. 
Euripides, while still a valuable source for the examiner of suffering, is affected 
by a standard that resonates too well with Aristotle’s mimetic model, which I 
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am discussing in the first chapter of this thesis. This is signalled in Aristotle’s 
own text, the Poetics, where Euripides is judged as best in what concerns the 
construction of a tragic plot: 
Wherefore,4 those who are accusing Euripides with doing this in his 
tragedies are wrong in saying that he does this in his tragedies and that 
many of his characters end in misfortune. That is, as was shown, correct. 
A very good example: for on the stage and in competitions such plays 
appear the most tragic of all, if they succeed; and even if Euripides is in 
other respects not a good administrator, yet he certainly seems to be the 
most tragic of the poets.5   
 
According to Aristotle’s rules, which I will discuss in the first chapter, 
Euripides’ incorporates in his tragedies that which Aristotle finds valuable, 
which, in turn, makes them the most tragic. This may be true in Aristotle’s 
terms, but in focusing excessively on tragic action, the depth of what tragedy 
tries to convey is missed. This is emphatically true in the case of suffering and 
pain.  
In the three plays I am analyzing, pain and that which it unveils takes 
precedence over plot. One other play, which is not included here, namely 
Sophocles’ Ajax, while not directly involving physical pain, does, nonetheless, 
expose the main character to such intense emotional and mental suffering that 
                                                
4 All translations of Aristotle and Plato from Greek (cited mainly in the first and second 
chapter) are my own, although several other translations and commentaries have been 
consulted in the process. The translations from the tragic texts are by different 
consecrated translators, cited in the specific sections of the thesis. 
5 Aristotle, Ars Poetica, ed. R. Kassel (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1966), accessed 4 
August 2015, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3atext%3a1999.01.0055, 
153a 24-30. 
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it achieves the same result as the plays where physical pain is approached 
directly: it brings a great hero to the limit of despondency, where he is laid bare 
of all the extensions of his former greatness. In doing so, Ajax’s case is similar to 
another mighty hero’s, Heracles, whose story is discussed here in the third 
chapter.  
It is necessary, for the development of this thesis, to address several 
conceptual systems. I am doing so on one hand in order to clear the path 
discourse-wise and get closer to the essence of the notion of pain, and on the 
other hand as a protest against subsequent developments in the theatre 
tradition and in the history of thought, where systems and concepts gain much 
acceptance and, eventually, enough political ground, turning into harmful 
ideologies. Whether the role of pain in tragedy is to challenge cultural 
stereotypes, achieve original means of expression, put the spectator on the same 
wavelength with a suffering individual, thus preparing him for an experience 
which is unavoidable, or all of the above, is very hard to determine. What is 
clear, however, is that Aeschylus and Sophocles do not shun pain in their plays. 
Elaine Scarry points to the fact that, while intense pain arrests language and is 
undeniably personal due to the impossibility of sharing it with another entirely, 
it is also impossible to hide. She notes that “pain comes unsharably into our 
midst as at once that which cannot be denied and that which cannot be 
10 
 
confirmed.”6 The complications that arise from this are explored in tragedy 
especially through the interactions of the suffering characters with their 
interlocutors, but also, and maybe even especially in the relation between 
spectators and stage. If all other elements in tragedy can be renarrativized or 
conceptualized differently, pain does not allow this. Nor does it allow any 
numbing mechanism to develop. Aristotle, Plato and Descartes take charge of 
the manufacturing of concepts that intermediate, explain and numb feeling. The 
impact these conceptual systems have results in the vilification of the corporeal 
and the construction of an artificial system through which one can detach 
oneself from the clenches of the visceral. However, Aeschylus and Sophocles 
refuse to prescribe this kind of pill. After challenging the analgesic systems of 
Aristotle, Plato and Descartes in the first and second chapter, I will be looking 
at pain and its exposure to different limits and pointing to the axes of analysis 
that this notion unveils.  
Therefore, chapter by chapter, this projects unfolds as follows: 
Chapter one looks at Aristotle’s Poetics in order to show that his model is 
a synthetic one through which he attempts to tame pain and clean tragedy of its 
inherent viscerality. My analysis in this chapter addresses mainly the concepts 
of mimesis and catharsis, then brings up the notion of ananke, which provides 
an alternative to Aristotle’s system in relation to tragedy. Aristotle holds that 
language in tragedy should be pleasant and expressive. Yet, when exposed to 
                                                
6
 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 4. 
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pain, language is broken in raw expressions and it does not follow the rules of 
metrics. With respect to exposing actions and character to pain, I side with 
Ricoeur, who favours actions as embodied series of events over plot, which is 
their logical reduction. Pain challenges action; as the mimesis of an action is 
itself an action, it stands to reason to call it an action twice removed. As action 
is substituted for by the plot, the action appears to be thrice removed, thus 
taming pain to the point of unrecognition. The heroes are also split by pain, 
which puts them in a passive, vulnerable position. Breaking the narrative and 
changing its course, pain puts Aristotle’s categorical thought to test. Mimesis, 
then, acts as a screen between world and tragedy, where the world is distilled 
and pain is tamed through a process of logical categorization. The second part of 
this chapter deals with Aristotle’s concept of catharsis, as a purgation of 
emotions through pity and fear. The immanence of pain challenges Aristotle’s 
explanation of the emotions as part of the plot. Adopting Aristotle’s system 
means that pain has a clear purpose and intelligibility in relation to the 
spectator; thus, pain is alleviated through logical understanding—its cure. 
Therefore, pain in tragedy, through its immanence and intensity, points to the 
rawness of representation that cannot be explained through Aristotle’s system. 
Ananke, the alternative notion that I discuss at the end of the first chapter, acts 
as a system internally balancing life. Ananke does not alleviate pain because it 
is not used as an intermediating concept, but as a system that exposes 
12 
 
vulnerability. Therefore, Ananke does not extricate the sufferer from the world 
of pain. 
The second chapter attempts to show that a discourse rooted in dualism 
alienates pain from tragedy. By focusing on the body in pain as an exposed 
subject and with the help of Jean Luc Nancy’s notion of pain as limit, I 
challenge Plato’s and Descartes’ dualistic thought. Plato, in the Phaedo, argues 
that the immortal soul must detach itself from its mortal receptacle: the 
deceitful, impure body. The soul must strive to become one with the undivided, 
pure divine. For Descartes, on the other hand one can penetrate the body 
through the mind. But intense pain dissolves the opposition between body and 
soul, thus cancelling the possibility of cognition. So both Plato and Descartes 
advance systems that put the body at a distance and come up with concepts 
such as mind and soul to mediate between realms. This is inconsistent with the 
tragic sphere, where there are no concepts and where pain is immanent and 
undeniable. Pain is there to split and expose the subject. Confronting dualism 
as such does not necessarily mean that I am advancing a holistic notion of the 
body. But I hold that in tragedy, the body is not approached by means of an 
intermediating conceptual system.  
In chapter three, I open the ground for several axes of analysis, through a 
hermeneutical approach. The investigation of pain in the texts is of a 
diagrammatic nature because a formalist textual analysis could not possibly 
serve the purpose of this thesis. In this chapter I am using pain as an 
13 
 
experience of the limit, and am looking at the different ways in which pain 
splits the subject. In the case of Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, a split is 
produced between the immortal and mortal realms; the intensity of Prometheus’ 
pain and his complete lack of agency challenge the notion that the body of a god 
belongs to a realm of immutability and plenitude. Pain and torture break down 
Prometheus’ world. From being creator of the human world, he is exposed as a 
vulnerable, incapacitated being. In the case of Philoctetes, pain is used to split 
the sufferer from the outside world through an “epistemic blockage.” Pain also 
tests the limits of language, by reducing the hero to an inarticulate creature. In 
the Trachiniae, the split that pain effects works at the level of the character. 
Heracles is on one hand weakened, humiliated and made to whimper like a girl, 
and on the other exposed in all his grotesque, bestial egomania. 
A study of pain, no matter how well defined, securely construed or, on the 
other hand, evasive or labyrinthine, will always reach a limit of expression. 
Pain is a concept that cannot be conceptualized, a moment that cannot be 
pinned down in time, an impression on the body which cannot be taken out of it 
and represented in a direct manner. However, in writing this thesis, one idea, 
connected to the above-quoted passage by Elaine Scarry, which the Greeks 
seemed to have understood, was prevalent, namely that pain is that which we 
cannot express to each other, but through which we all connect: in pain we are 
all alike.  
14 
 
Finally, I must acknowledge that this project is inspired by Nietzsche’s 
Birth of Tragedy, which prompted me to work against a type of Apollonian 
discourse and align the inquiry into my topic with a Dionysian approach, 
centered on pain. 
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Chapter 1 
 Aristotle, Pain Will Tear Us Apart 
While the present thesis is not concerned with the study of tragedy as 
genre, nor essentially with the themes that frequently come up in theoretical 
works on tragedy, but specifically with the occurrence of pain in tragedy, it is 
still necessary to commence by taking into account Aristotle’s work on mimetic 
art—the Poetics. In this tract, Aristotle examines, through a process of 
classification, what he considers to be essential in poetry, specifically in epic 
and tragedy. At first sight, the Poetics seems to merely provide a set of 
peremptory pronouncements on the art of poetry. At a second, some of the 
notions he sets ground for seem to be founded on fortuitous assumptions. 
Nevertheless, it is the first extant work that looks at tragedy’s modus operandi 
without being guided to do so by a didactic impulse (although a moralizing djinn 
does creep in at 1454a and b, when Aristotle expresses his partiality towards 
good character in tragedy as opposed to the bad variety, prevalent in comedy). 
In the Poetics, then, Aristotle discusses poetry as craft (τέχνη) and 
classifies, in twenty-six passages, the aspects that constitute good poetry. In 
what concerns tragedy, its six components are plot (µῦθος), character (ἦθος), 
diction (λέξις), thought (διάνοια), appearance or spectacle  (ὄψις) and music 
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(µελοποιία)7. Central to his development of an analysis of tragedy are also the 
concepts of mimesis (µίµησις) and catharsis (κάθαρσις)8, which I will investigate 
in this chapter in their relation (or lack of, thereof) to pain in tragedy. The 
ubiquitously-cited definition of tragedy appears in section six of the tract and 
reads thus: 
Tragedy, then, is the imitation of a serious and complete action, which 
has magnitude, by means of language with pleasurable accessories, each 
kind brought in separately in the parts of the work, by acting, not by 
narrating, with incidents arousing pity and fear, in order to accomplish 
the catharsis of such emotions.9  
The definition works on three axes: those of the action, language and emotions. 
In what follows, I will unpack the main conceptual elements of this 
classification and argue that Aristotle is missing one important component in 
his internal taxonomy of tragedy, one that the incidence of pain in most ancient 
Greek plays and particularly in the tragedies that constitute the corpus for this 
thesis, provides the clue to, namely the viscerality of representation. 
 
 
                                                
7 Aristotle, Poetics, section six. 
8 I will not continue the pretentious practice of transliterating all Greek terms; I will 
use, from here on, the terms not italicized, especially since mimesis, catharsis and 
praxis are commonly used in critical theory as such. Other terms, less frequent in 
critical literature, which I am introducing as the argument procedes, such as ananke, I 
will italicize throughout. 
9 Aristotle, Poetics, 1449b 24-28. 
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1.1 Mimesis, Praxis and Pain 
Mimesis, which is usually rendered in English translations either as 
“imitation” or “representation,” is the first concept I will be dealing with here, 
since it is central to Aristotle’s definition of tragedy. In fact, this is the only 
concept that expands throughout the whole tract. There is a generalized 
tendency among Aristotelian scholars10 to examine the main ideas in the Poetics 
as rooted in the need to respond to Plato’s dismissal of poets and their art in the 
Republic and Laws. However, there is no textual evidence in the Poetics that 
Aristotle is attempting to counter Plato’s dogmatic critique of mimetic poetry. 
For Plato, as Paul Woodruff explains: 
(…) mimesis is often understood to involve deception, and is very often 
used pejoratively of arts or crafts which Plato considers harmful or at 
least inferior. When Plato does not use the term pejoratively he uses it as 
part of a metaphysical theory. Yet neither the pejorative nor the 
metaphysical use surfaces in the Poetics, though most scholars hear 
echoes of Plato there. What is even more remarkable, Aristotle makes no 
mention of any differences he may have with Plato’s mimesis.11  
Aristotle, then, is not concerned with Plato’s metaphysical preoccupation 
with what concerns mimesis. For Plato, especially in Book X of the Republic, the 
work of art imitates things as they appear in the world, while these things 
                                                
10 Such as: J. W. H. Atkins, Literary criticism in antiquity (Cambridge, 1934) and 
Richard McKeon, “Literary Criticism and the Concept of Imitation in Antiquity,” 
Modern Philology 34 (1936): 1-35. 
11 Paul Woodruff, “Aristotle on Mimēsis,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Poetics, ed. Amélie 
Rort (Chichester : Princeston University Press, 1992), 75. 
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themselves are imitations of ideas. This is problematic in Plato’s case because it 
follows that the work of art is twice removed from the world of ideas and, 
therefore, artists deceive through their mimetic art and should not be entrusted 
with education in Plato’s ideal state, as he claims they are. Paul Ricœur, in the 
first volume of Temps et récit, is correct in noting that, as opposed to Plato’s 
rendition of mimesis, “Aristotle’s mimesis has just a single space wherein it is 
unfolded—human making [faire], the arts of composition.”12  
In order to analyze the use of mimesis in Aristotle’s definition of tragedy, 
I will track it back to the beginning of the treatise. Aristotle uses the term 
mimesis several times, but he never defines it; instead, the concept’s meaning 
transpires through his contextual use of the term. Its first use, at the outset of 
the Poetics, is the following generalizing statement, where he puts all forms of 
poetry under the umbrella of mimesis and where he also starts the process of 
categorization, which will lead to his definition of tragedy: 
Epic and the poetry of tragedy, as well as comedy, dithyrambic poetry and 
most of flute playing and citharaplaying—all together happen to be 
modes of mimesis; but they differ one from another in three ways: in 
representing13 either by different means, or in the different objects or in 
representing not in the same way but in a different manner. For example 
through both color and form people represent many things, making 
                                                
12 Paul Ricœur, Time and Narrative, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 34. 
13 I have translated the verbs that are cognates of mimesis by “representing,” since 
“making mimesis” is redundant. 
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likeness of them14 (some by means of a craft and some through 
acquaintance), while others by use of the human voice. In this way, in the 
mentioned arts, they all make representations in rhythm and language 
and tune, using these means either separately or in combination.15 
Mimesis, then, has different facets, depending on the means, objects and 
manner of representation, all of which apply to tragedy and are mentioned in 
Aristotle’s definition; yet mimesis is also a unifying concept. Given the 
broadness of this enumeration, it is not clear how mimesis is related to craft 
(τέχνη). Likewise, it is unclear if the making of an object’s likeness is related to 
acquaintance or custom. Here he uses the word συνήθεια, which seems to carry 
somewhat derisive implied accents, as it suggests a sort of ingenium honed 
through ars as opposed to acquired artistry; in Aristotle’s assessment, the 
balance noticeably tilts towards the latter. This is an intriguing point because 
the relation between craft and nature is facilitated through mimesis, as he 
argues in Physics (199a), where mimesis is a method of intervention when 
nature is faulty (through the craft of medicine, for example). It is reasonable to 
postulate, then, that Aristotle builds a system with the aid of the concept of 
mimesis through which he attempts to cure or at least correct that which is 
aberrant in nature, such as pain. If, then, representing things through custom, 
acquaintance, ingenium and, by extension, instinct, is a lesser activity than 
                                                
14 ἀπεικάζω translates, unlike µιµέοµαι, as “making a copy in the likeness of something,” 
but also as “imagine”. It is related to the noun ἀπείκασµα, which means “copy,” 
“representation”. So, if considered hierarchically, the former is one step down on the 
scale of abstraction.  
15 Aristotle, Poetics, 1447a 15-22. 
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representing through craft, tragedy is stripped of a certain type of rawness, 
which, I believe, is crucial and completely overlooked in most studies concerned 
with tragedy from Aristotle onwards. So turning towards the notion of pain 
through the occurrences of which I will show that not everything in tragedy is a 
construct that aims to explain or resolve, it can be shown that Aristotle’s mode 
of classification misses the point. In what follows, I will take up each of 
Aristotle’s categories and illustrate how in ancient tragedy, especially in the 
plays I am looking at, pain shakes the ground on which these modes are built 
and, therefore, the concept of mimesis itself is thus challenged.  
1.1.1 Means of Representation 
There are certain arts which use all those means that were mentioned; I 
am speaking of those such as rhythm and tune and metre, for example 
dithyrambic and “nomic” poetry and tragedy too and comedy: they differ 
is that some use all these at once, others use them in succession. These 
differences between arts, I say, are those that bring mimesis into 
existence.16 
So rhythm, tune and metre are the means of representation in poetic arts here, 
but “language with pleasurable accessories, each kind brought in separately in 
the parts of the work” appears in the definition of tragedy. Hence, while the 
means employed in mimetic arts in general are the three aforementioned, 
tragedy hinges on language, which is diversified (or made pleasant) through 
other modes, by which I infer that language assists in the procurement of 
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 Aristotle, Poetics, 1447b 25-28. 
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aesthetic pleasure rather than serving a purely utilitarian purpose. Following 
through with the definition, I also deduce that language must be sufficiently 
detailed in order to convey a range of actions and emotions (although the 
relevant ones here are pity and fear). However, when examining the incidence of 
pain in tragedy, it is clear that language is neither complex, not pleasant.  
Building towards a theory of pain, Elaine Scarry argues that the 
experience of pain escapes language, abandoning the victim confused and muted 
by its incommunicability. Her argument is based on the rightful assertion that 
language is destroyed by pain: the experience is forceful and words fail as soon 
as one is exposed to it. It is impossible, according to her, to find a manner of 
expressing pain that accurately articulates its severity. As Scarry puts it: 
“physical pain does not simply resist language but actively destroys it, bringing 
about an immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to the sounds and 
cries a human being makes before language is learned.”17 Where pain makes an 
apparition in Greek tragedy, language is used only to suggest, but neither 
words, nor metre, nor any other mimetic mode get to the core of the experience. 
Scarry ascribes this mode of experience to an “absolute split between one’s sense 
of one’s own reality and the reality of other persons.”18 She continues by 
contending that it is exactly through this divide between language and reality 
that pain attains the suggestion of the experience’s force: “Thus, pain comes 
                                                
17 Elaine Scarry, Body in Pain, 4. 
18 Ibid. 
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unsharably into our midst as at once that which cannot be denied and that 
which cannot be confirmed. Whatever pain achieves, it achieves in part through 
its unsharability, and it ensures this unsharability through its resistance to 
language.”19 As immanent and inexorable the experience of pain is, the 
expression of it is fundamentally contaminated by its essential ineffability. It 
follows that, where pain is expressed in tragedy, words are often replaced by 
cries and shrieks, thus language, instead of articulating, is broken down, but 
still, as I will show in the third chapter of this thesis, manages to perform. 
There is, then, in the expression of pain, simultaneously the destruction and 
creation of language, as Scarry goes on to argue.  
Philoctetes, one of the plays that constitute the focus of the third chapter, 
is worthy of attention here because it explores physical pain methodically and 
meticulously, while also placing the suffering subject in an environment and 
situation that reflect his pain. The context of this play proves that Sophocles 
was well aware of the potency of pain: all action and the Trojan War itself are 
halted in order to deal with the agony of a disposed man. The hero, Philoctetes, 
unlike other heroes in Greek epic and tragedy, such as Odysseus, his antagonist 
in this play, is neither influential, nor virile, but a frail, suffering man, isolated 
on the deserted island of Lemnos. When examining the core of this tragedy, one 
cannot make valid claims about the usage of language with pleasurable 
                                                
19 Elaine Scarry, Body in Pain, 4. 
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accessories. This following exchange between Philoctetes and Neoptolemus, at 
the end of a long scene of agony, conveys the nauseating disintegration of 
language and, I think, the point of such a passage in a play is to illustrate the 
failure of language and the necessity to go beyond it: 
Neoptolemus: Yes, terrible is the burden of the disease. 
Philoctetes: Terrible that cannot be spoken! Oh, have pity upon me!20  
What else can more clearly demonstrate the failure of Aristotle’s mimetic model 
of expression through language that this last line uttered by the suffering hero: 
“δεινὸν γὰρ οὐδὲ ῥητόν” (terrible that cannot be spoken)? Philoctetes experiences a 
complete disconnection from any cognitive process that could help him explain 
or narrate his experience. The young Neoptolemus is forced, thus, to remain 
outside of the suffering, in spite of trying to access it through understanding, 
and that causes an extreme alienation between the sufferer and anyone who 
could offer compassion (which means, literally, to suffer with). In Philoctetes, 
the episodes in which Philoctetes is in extreme pain are most vivid, but they do 
not advance the plot in any way. A limit of both language and sentience is 
reached here, through the gradual intensification of pain, the breakdown of 
language into cries and groans and, finally, as Philoctetes faints, the cessation 
of sentience and language. I return to the analysis of the whole scene of which 
                                                
20 This fragment from Philoctetes is in my own translation, but the subsequent ones are 
from Aeschylus, The Women of Trachis and Philoctetes, trans. Robert Torrance. 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin),1966. 754-756. 
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the above-quoted lines are part of in the third chapter, when I investigate pain 
in light of the experience of limit. For the time being, it has been established 
that Aristotle’s concept of mimesis does not stand its ground in what concerns 
the means of representation when faced with the occurrence of pain. The 
following axis of investigation follows Aristotle’s next piece in the construction 
of a concept of mimesis, namely the things that are being represented. 
  1.1.2 Objects of Representation: Actions and Characters. 
Since the things being represented by the imitators are actions, it is 
necessary for the agents to be either good men or inferior, since, nearly 
always, characters are made unique, for all differ in character through 
vice and virtue, therefore they are either better than us or inferior in such 
wise. It is the same with painters.21 
Praxis appears as the first element of the definition of tragedy and here, in this 
more general account of mimetic arts, it seems to be the precursor of plot or, as 
Ricœur calls it, the definiens Aristotle substitutes for the definiendum.22 This 
element is of great importance for Aristotle, since he focuses on it almost 
exclusively from section seven until the twenty-sixth. Ricoeur goes as much as 
to advance the idea that muthos is the core of tragedy and of mimesis: 
This quasi-identification is warranted first by placing the six parts into a 
hierarchy that gives priority to the what or object of representation (plot, 
characters, thought) in relation to the by which or means (language and 
melody) and the how or mode (the spectacle); then by a second 
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 Aristotle, Poetics, 1448a 1-5. 
22 Ricœur, Time and Narrative, 34. 
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hierarchization internal to the what that sets the action above the 
characters and the thought. (…) At the conclusion of this double 
hierarchization, the plot appears as the first principle, the end, the 
purpose, and, if we may say so, the soul of tragedy.23 
He further argues that the contention that mimesis is first and foremost defined 
through muthos, as persuasive as it may seem, is not to be taken too far and he 
is right in noting that in the Poetics there is no evidence that would support this 
claim, in spite of the length of Aristotle’s commentary on plot and its elements. 
Praxis, when looked at through the lens of emplotment in tragedy, is a construct 
of an action. As Kosman articulates it, “the medium of the mimesis of action is 
itself an action”24—so an action twice removed. Dramatic art, then, is defined 
through the construct of the mimesis of action. The kind of action that is 
represented in drama (serious and complete) is secondary to this claim. From 
here follows that to talk about pain in dramatic form is to talk about an 
unrepresentable non-action, which somehow still makes its way in Greek 
tragedy. This—Aristotle does not take into account. Representing pain in the 
mimetic way that Aristotle proposes, as the action of an action—therefore acting 
what pain looks like, through actions, shrieks, words, etc., is at least 
unsatisfactory. Rather, what happens in a theatrical production is the 
recreation in the moment, with the help of a construct, of a particular instant. 
Inserting pain into this section of Aristotle’s model is again problematic because 
                                                
23 Ricœur, Time and Narrative, 34. 
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 Aryeh Kosman, “Acting: Drama as the Mimesis of Praxis,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Poetics, 
ed. Amélie Rort (Chichester : Princeston University Press, 1992), 58. 
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to represent pain on Aristotle’s terms can be read as an attempt at taming pain. 
Reliance on mimetic mechanics to give pain shape in tragedy would result in 
plotting the actions that are projected onto pain—so we are thrice removed from 
the pain itself: by the fact that pain happens to someone who is a character 
written by a poet and acted by an actor, but also through language and the 
medium. Rather, after an examination of pain in tragedy, it appears that when 
pain is not performed, it is approximated, either by the employment of images, 
such as the objects that represent agents of pain. For example, the chains in 
Prometheus Bound, the cloak in Trachiniae or even the wound or body part 
itself in Philoctetes are good examples of approximation in relation to external 
objects. This can also be done through the temporal, spatial, sensory or affective 
dimensions. These terms, however, only approximate, through a process that 
Scary calls analogical substantiation25, where the pain felt by the sufferer is 
projected onto something else—an object external to the sensation itself. An 
example that is easy to comprehend is that of the knife cutting through the 
skin: the pain is attributed to the object that inflicts it, but pain is in the body, 
not in the knife.  
The process of mimesis through action is removed from the core of pain 
also because the characters are the ones doing the action that gets represented 
in drama. However, as in the above-quoted excerpt from Philoctetes, it is clear 
                                                
25 Scarry, Body in Pain, 14. 
27 
 
that the main character is in no capacity to participate in a praxis of any kind—
he is completely devoid of agency when he is immersed in suffering. What is 
relevant and what tragic poets seem to have understood is not the construct of 
plot that traps action as in a mesh, in order to represent it, after steamrolling it, 
on stage, for a public that is waiting to feel the emotions and go through a 
process of purgation, but rather the immediacy of being immersed in a state and 
the incapacitating intensity of that state. Pain in tragedy has the opposite effect 
of the positivist mimetic action, build through action, plot and pleasant 
language, as Aristotle’s definition premises.  
Aristotle’s insistence on good versus inferior character demonstrates that 
there are, in fact, traces of Plato’s influence in his theory of poetic arts. In 
tragedy, in the presence of pain, the good/bad dichotomy is obliterated and the 
characters’ bearings are consistent and independent of the nature of his 
character or of his previous actions. It is the case, for example, of proud and 
revengeful Ajax, whose misfortune is as actual as that of a worthier hero would 
have been. 
The remaining constituent of Aristotle’s system of mimesis, namely 
manner, is subordinated to and contingent on the previous elements, language 
and action.  
1.1.3 Manner of Representation 
A third difference in these arts is the manner in which one may represent 
each of these objects. For in representing the same objects by the same 
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means it is possible to report at one moment by narrative and at another 
by assuming a character, as Homer does, or by executing things as they 
are throughout, without change, or else the imitators may act out all 
things as though they were executing them.26  
The important notion here is that the focus is shifted from the representation 
itself to the things doing the representing; the kind of mimetic art used for this 
purpose is not specified, so it follows that this can be applied to all poetic arts. 
The author, then, can either narrate the action, or use indirect speech, or he can 
act out the characters himself. This mode of mimesis is relevant for the 
problematisation of pain because it takes into consideration the relation 
between author and character, although, as Ricœur notes, since for Aristotle 
character is subordinated to action27, mimesis is a representation of the action 
of characters. This idea is at the core of many attempts to argue that Aristotle 
aims, by looking at mimesis as pure imitation, to develop a theory of realism. 
The work of the author is to represent by reporting (ἀπαγγέλλοντα), regardless of 
whether this act is carried out in dramatic or epic form. Although pain resists 
language and accurate representation, it still does appear in tragedy and in 
literature, which shows that its fictionalisation is significant. By metaphoric 
approximation, pain is nevertheless represented outside of the body; the 
purpose that it serves in tragedy is still to be discussed, but this last mode of 
mimesis in the Poetics is, I think, one that does not collapse when put to trial. 
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 Aristotle, Poetics, 1448a 20-25. 
27 Ricœur, Time and Narrative, 37. 
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The author is the agent of mimesis and it is through him that one can have 
access to the fictional world of the characters and, consequently, to their pain. It 
is important to remember this when attempting to analyze such concepts as 
suffering and physical pain since, in the larger context of these plays, there is a 
possibility that the author is manipulating a character’s suffering in order to 
serve a different purpose other than an internal one.  
1.2 Emotions and Catharsis 
In Aristotle’s definition of tragedy, emotions must be induced in a safe 
way (through mimesis rather than through real experience) and, because of 
this, the cathartic relief might make the spectators into better people. The 
discussion, then, moves from action, characters and the author to the spectator: 
However, since (tragedy is the) mimesis not only of a complete action but 
also (of incidents arousing) fear and pity, and these have the greatest 
effect on the mind when they happen without control and in consequence 
of one other (as an effect); for there is more marvel in them than if they 
happened by accident or by chance…28 
The mimesis of action is responsible for catharsis (whether Aristotle 
means by this term “purgation” or something else is not clear, but the literature 
on it does tend to imply a purification of some type). The terms ἐλέος and φόβος 
appear in the definition of tragedy as well and they have been translated as pity 
and, respectively, fear or terror. It is not clear how exactly pity and fear would 
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bring about catharsis, but it seems that Aristotle knows in detail the workings 
of the spectators’ minds, although these mechanisms are not linked with the 
emotions themselves, but, once again, with the plot.  
The idea of a pleasurable catharsis is an unlikely one, while catharsis as 
education through exposure to tragic events that arouse pity and fear in the 
spectators is also problematic, for what would the audience gain in education by 
being, for instance, exposed to the sufferings of a man whose disease is 
contacted by mischance and who is being manipulated by a cunning politician 
who is trying to steal his only possession of value, his bow?  Jacob Bernays, for 
example, in his famous nineteenth century work Fundamentals of Aristotle’s 
Lost Essay on the “Effect of Tragedy” explains catharsis either as a religious 
purification, resulting in an extatic state, or as medical purgation.29 Martha 
Naussbaum advances another influential (and cognitivist) interpretation of 
catharsis, arguing that catharsis, although it involves emotion, is in fact part of 
a process of “ethical investigation”30. Cynthia Freeland explains this cognitive 
process that applies to the spectator: “when the audience responds to the 
depicted events of a play with the emotions of pity and fear, they think and 
learn, and they come to draw appropriate judgements concerning the moral 
                                                
29 Jacob Bernays, “On Catharsis,” from ‘Fundamentals of Aristotle’s Lost Essay on the 
“Effect of Tragedy”,’ in American Images, vol. 61, no. 3 (Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 2004), 319-341. 
30 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Tragedy and Self-Suficiency: Plato and Aristotle on Fear and 
Pity,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Poetics, ed. Amélie Rorthy, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1992), 261-290. 
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issues and and problems represented in the play.”31 Jonathan Lear, on the other 
hand, provides the following alternative of interpretation: 
It is this experience of the tragic emotions in an appropriately 
inappropriate environment which, I think, helps to explain out the 
experience of relief in the theatre. We imaginatively live life to the full, 
but we risk nothing. The relief is thus not that of releasing pent-up 
emotions per se, it is the relief of releasing these emotions in a safe 
environment.32  
It is not certain whether the Greeks thought of tragedy in these terms or if they 
felt the relief that Lear is writing about. It can be argued that the experience of 
the religious festivals, Lenaia and Dionysia, during which the plays were 
performed, created a certain kind of euphoria and it seems that all actions 
around the plays and the performances themselves were highly ritualized. Pity 
and fear by themselves do not seem to constitute the pent-up emotions that 
need to be released in a controlled environment. Pity is a tame, processed 
emotion, while fear can be of many kinds and Aristotle does not specify which 
one he refers to here. What is clear, however, is that Aristotle does not believe 
in the immediacy of the actions that arouse emotions; for him, emotions are 
contingent on surprise and sequencing. This is once more problematic when 
looking at the occurrence of pain. In the excerpt from Philoctetes that I used as 
                                                
31 Cynthia A. Freeland, “Plot Immitates Action: Aesthetic Evaluation and Moral 
Realism in Aristotle’s Poetics,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Poetics, ed. Amélie Rorthy, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 111-132. 
32 Jonathan Lear, “Katharsis,” in in Essays on Aristotle’s Poetics, ed. Amélie Rort 
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an example above, pain comes and goes unexpectedly, but in no specific order or 
sequence. It is also impossible to know what exactly a spectator feels when 
exposed to an enactment of a crisis such as Philoctetes’. It is reasonable, 
therefore, to postulate that explaining the presence of pain in tragedy through 
catharsis as purgation, relief or education is an attempt to medicate or hide it, 
which is to do injustice to the author, the play and to the spectator as well.  
1.3. Mimesis as the Analgesic Principle  
In the Poetics, Aristotle’s work is that of classifying, explaining, taming 
through logic and the victim is, in the extant part of the tract, tragedy; comedy 
did not escape his scrutiny either, but the section dedicated to it has vanished. 
For Aristotle, mimesis is what happens naturally and it is what differentiates 
men from animals. Before the categorization of poetic mimesis, he explains: 
People have an innate aptitude for representation from childhood, and in 
this respect, they differ from other animals in being much more able to 
imitate and learn from the first experiences by representing things and 
also to find pleasure in the representations all things.33 
Therefore, mimesis is Aristotle’s representational lens—that through which 
men must pass in order to attain their place in the hierarchy of nature. Not only 
is mimesis necessary and inherent, since men are born with the instinct of 
representing, but everything in nature can be represented, since (here) it is a 
learning tool for children. So the spectrum of representation is limitless, but the 
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genre does impose certain constraints (such as the ones mentioned in the 
definition of tragedy and discussed above—objects, manner and means of 
representation). Since all arts are mimetic in nature, it follows that everything 
can be represented in art through mimesis. It follows that, with this concept 
applied onto the dramatic genre, mimesis becomes a screen between world and 
stage. If this idea is linked to the one discussed in the beginning of this chapter, 
where I was arguing that mimesis can be seen as a corrective principle, through 
which Aristotle tries to remedy that which is anomalous in nature, the 
consequence is that mimesis becomes the screen through which nature gets 
distilled, purified or adjusted when represented on stage. In the case of pain in 
tragedy, then, mimesis acts like an analgesic principle, since, according to 
Aristotle’s argument, pain has to go through a filter that tames it through 
logical subjugation and shows it in such a way as to serve a chosen aesthetic, 
ethical and pedagogic purpose. But in the moments of pain representation has 
already been shifted through pain’s externalization and its projection onto an 
object (Scarry’s analogical substantiation) through a compensation that is 
necessary due to pain’s incommunicability. Just as discussed above at 1.1.3, in 
the case of action and plot where, according to Aristotle’s system, it follows that 
the action represented is doubly removed from its immediacy; here, when 
discussing the effect that mimesis has when applied to pain, the cogent case can 
be made that tragedy’s pain is twofold removed, once through substantiation 
and one more time through the mimesis of the substantiation. The effect is that, 
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through this double removal from pain by means of an artificial process of 
mimesis, which gives tragic suffering a purpose in relation to the public, 
whatever tragedy stirs, is alleviated; it is, therefore, safe for the spectator to be 
affected by tragic pathos, since it is morally justified and intelligible from a 
logical standpoint. Aristotle uses his system, in a way, to save himself and the 
spectators of tragedy the uneasiness of being confronted with instances of pain 
that cannot be accounted for directly. This logical explanation is compelling and 
certainly does its job well as an analgesic, but it is artificial and contrived 
because it is not found inside the tragic system, as Aristotle never looks at 
tragedy other than to draw, out of context, examples that illustrate his system. 
It is, instead, a system that is imposed from the outside with the purpose of 
alleviating and offsetting the impact of being exposed to pain and suffering on 
stage. The indignation that results from being confronted with suffering that 
does not have a clear cause or meaning can be, as Nietzsche also notes in the 
Genealogy of Morals, exasperating and can aggravate the impact of exposure: 
What truly enrages people about suffering is not the suffering itself, but 
the meaninglessness of suffering. But neither for the Christian, who has 
interpreted into suffering an entire secret machinery for salvation, nor for 
the naïve men of older times, who understood how to interpret all 
suffering in relation to the spectator or to the person inflicting the 
suffering, was there generally any such meaningless suffering. In order 
for the hidden, undiscovered, unwitnessed suffering to be removed from 
the world and for people to be able to deny it honestly, they were then 
almost compelled to invent gods and intermediate beings at all levels, 
high and low—briefly put, something that also roamed in hidden places, 
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that also looked into the darkness, and that would not readily permit an 
interesting painful spectacle to escape its attention.34 
If meaningless suffering is what truly scares people, as Nietzsche argues, 
Aristotle seems to come up with a system that integrates and explains suffering, 
giving it a purpose and, thus, subduing it. However, Aristotle does not achieve 
what he sets out to do because a logical system can only act as an analgesic for a 
small kind of pain; when confronted with tragic pain, a logical mimetic system 
is annihilated forthwith. Nietzsche correctly identifies here that “suffering in 
relation to the spectator or to the person inflicting the suffering” may actually 
be integrated into a system that gives it meaning, which is key in relation to 
Aristotle’s system as well. But when taking into account the sufferer himself—
Philoctetes, Prometheus or Hercules—it is not a valid system anymore. Pain in 
tragedy is unbearable; it completely dominates and subdues the character, 
whose agency is taken away. Logical meaning, ideas or systems do not have the 
capacity to remove one from the experience of extreme physical pain because 
they cannot remove the sufferer from his world, as Nietzsche suggests in his 
own attempt at integrating suffering. One may wonder if it is possible to do so 
at all, even with the invention of gods that govern the world in its entirety, for it 
seems that no matter what system is chosen to make sense of the physical 
realm and impose order in the sufferer’s world, when pain is very intense, any 
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such structure fails to intervene at the concrete level. However, although a 
system may fail when the severity of the suffering is extreme, it could work in 
other cases, when the sufferer is able to project himself outside of his immediate 
surroundings and the suffering can be integrated as part of an assignment that 
the subject can accept. Then it is possible, through equanimity and non-
identification with the physical body, to alleviate pain somewhat, but this is not 
the case with the characters that experience pain in the tragedies that I am 
discussing here. However, an alternative system to Aristotle’s mimetic model 
can make sense and I will briefly discuss it below because it is consistent with 
the Greek tragic context.   
1.4. Ananke 
When looking at the prevalence of ἀνάγκη 35 in tragedy, especially in the plays 
that constitute the corpus of this thesis, there are two main issues: one relating 
to scope and one to rendering. Martin Ostwald opens his analysis of the concept 
in Thucydides by giving a general account of the term and the complications 
that arise in its discussion: 
…to substitute “necessity” or a cognate term for every occurrence of an 
ἀνάγκη word will not do, since we cannot assume that the range of the 
English term is coextensive with the Greek. English “necessity”, its 
lexical definitions apart, has a number of different connotations. It may 
be something foreordained by a divinity or predetermined by some 
                                                
35 I will use the transcribed version, ananke, of the term from here on. 
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transcendental and inscrutable force which man is powerless to resist. It 
may be inherent in our human condition, such as the necessity to breathe, 
eat, sleep, and eventually die; it may be thought of as inhering in the laws 
of the physical universe, such as gravity or the motion of the earth and 
the celestial bodies. It is usually regarded as inescapable, but there are 
also instances in which it is—or can be—avoided. For example, the 
payment of taxes is almost universally necessary; but what if a person 
forgets to pay or pays less than his share? Nothing may happen if the 
neglect remains undiscovered; much may happen if one is found out.36  
Whether ananke is abstract divine authority exercising autonomy over the 
human sphere, personal compulsion, metaphysical necessity, natural order or 
moral duty, it can be seen, especially in tragedy, as one of the main driving 
forces of the plot. Out of the four moral norms, all personified into goddesses in 
Greek mythology (Δίκη, the goddess of justice, Τύχη, goddess of chance, Άνάγκη, 
goddess of necessity and Μοίρα, goddess of fate), ananke probably gets the least 
attention in critical theory and it is often generalized as a metaphysical 
necessity that relates, somehow, to the divine. Northorp Frye, who, other than 
making the mistake of equating ananke with moira, provides a compelling 
explanation for the internal workings of tragedy: “The Greek ananke or moira is 
in its normal or pre-tragic form the internal balancing condition of life. It 
appears as an external or antithetical necessity only after it has been violated 
as a condition of life.”37 Frye looks at ananke as a force external to man and to 
the tragic characters, which is only awakened and turned into a negative force 
                                                
36 Martin Ostwald, Ananke in Thucydides (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 6. 
37 Cited in: Rebecca Bushnell, Tragedy, a Short Introduction (Victoria, Australia: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 54.  
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that affects humans after the balance is disturbed. This, in turn, given the lack 
of a clear context of reference for the term, can result in an a posteriori 
application of the concept by critics. Nonetheless, there always remains in 
tragedy a certain dynamic between choice and ananke, as agency is not ever 
totally subdued other than, in fact, when dealing with pain. In one chapter 
entitled Freedom, Fate and Justice from his excellent work Sweet Violence, the 
Idea of the Tragic, Terry Eagleton underlines the constant pull between freedom 
and predestined doom. He also brings up the Aristotelian ἁµαρτία, the error that, 
in the Poetics, is linked with the concept of ananke: 
Aristotle seems to contrast not freedom and necessity, but inner and 
outer necessities. There is a dash of psychological determinism about his 
thought. Indeed, if the hamartia or moral flaw which supposedly causes 
tragedy is built into our temperament, and is less sin than innocent error, 
how can we be held responsible for it?38   
But the tragic character is held responsible for his own errors and, many times, 
also for the errors of his ancestors, such as in Aeschylus’ Oresteia. The 
discussion of ananke in Greek tragedy is a complex one and it would be a 
compelling subject of an extended analysis. Here, I am using it as an example of 
another concept whose workings apply to tragedy’s structure much better than 
Aristotle’s mimesis. When looking at pain, ananke can certainly explain the 
context of the characters’ sufferings and can also provide the meaning that 
                                                
38 Terry Eagleton, “Freedom, Fate,” in Sweet Violence, The Idea of the Tragic (Hoboken, 
Jew Jersey: Wiley Blackwell, 2002), 118.  
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could help the spectator make sense of the suffering. However, in the Greek 
world it does not seem that a sort of transcendental contingency can elucidate or 
give a coherent frame of reference that would assuage the suffering. Rather, one 
can intuit an ambiguous system based on the dynamic between the human and 
the divine, whose logistics are not always apparent and which cannot extricate 
the sufferer from his physical world, where his pain takes place and precedence. 
Such is the case in Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, where the workings of ananke 
are conspicuous. However, ananke cannot and does not act as an analgesic; nor 
is the hero’s pain lessened in any way by the necessity of his punishment. 
Rather, one can argue that it is exactly the opposite: his suffering is worsened 
by the despotism of his torturer, Zeus, and by the obscure dynamic between 
human justice and divine will.  
 Therefore, if one takes an honest look at tragedy, it is apparent that the 
concepts Aristotle builds his conceptual system on, such as mimesis, hamartia, 
plot and catharsis, only touch the surface of what tragedy really is. Pain in all 
its forms, but especially in its very intense moments, still remains outside of the 
perimeters of different systems that may try to explain it, give it meaning and 
alleviate it. If, however, one is looking for a system that could incorporate it, 
this is not to be found in Aristotle’s categorizations. Rather, a frame of 
reference, such as ananke, is more appropriate. Pain seems to resist integration 
in any such system and it is conceivable, in fact, that this is its main role in 
tragedy: to go beyond elucidation, to be that which cannot be tamed. 
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 In this chapter I examined Aristotle’s systematic analysis of what he 
renders as significant in tragic poetry and, most importantly, I investigated 
whether his conceptual device, mimesis, has any relevance in what concerns 
pain in tragedy. I found that Aristotle’s approach seems to be rather the work of 
a pharmacologist, who tries to explain the symptoms, taken out of their poetic 
context, then applies the logical bandage of his system of categorization. He is 
not ever truthfully looking at tragedy as a medium that could have another 
impact on one beyond a didactic and emotionally-spewing one. However, the 
concept of ananke does advance several ideas, which help in the development of 
the analysis of pain in the following chapters. First of all, it is apparent now 
that an intricate network of forces, related to both the human and the divine, 
determines the modus operandi in tragedy. Secondly, there is a question of what 
forces are internal and external to the characters, especially to the ones 
suffering pain and if this is at all relevant in the moment of intense pain. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, is the question of the body, both the human and 
the divine body and whether the pangs of pain and the workings of ananke 
pertain to both categories. For now, however, it is safe to claim that, while 
Aristotle does not benefit an analysis of pain in tragedy, engaging with his 
categorical thought critically facilitates the subsequent investigation, since his 
system is still greatly influential in the theory of tragedy. 
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Chapter 2  
The Body: Excretions and Extentions 
    If body is always deep but deepest at its surface. 
                   Anne Carson 
Since this thesis is an exploration of pain, I shall, in what follows, 
determine what the confines of this experience are as it relates to the body. Pain 
can have different facets and be intertwined with many things, such as disease, 
emotional and mental suffering, insanity and a myriad of afflictions that throw 
one out of the normal—a normal that is mostly a construct and highly 
customizable, according to culture, nationality, sex, gender, age, social context 
and so on. But the notion is usually applied to designate experiences pertaining 
to one thing in particular: the body. This thesis looks specifically at physical 
pain, namely pain experienced in the body; whether this pain is the projection of 
another kind of suffering is a secondary issue in what concerns the analysis that 
I am undertaking in this second chapter. Since the way tragedy is read 
nowadays is highly influenced by the dualistic split between the body and soul, I 
will look at the two dualist traditions that are most significant in how we frame 
the body: the Platonic and the Cartesian one. Then I will compare these two 
ways of rendering the body to what transpires from the Greek tradition 
surrounding Greek tragedy, which is not rooted in the aforementioned split. 
This account of reference frames pertaining to the body is by no means 
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pretending to be an exhaustive one. In critical theory, the body is an object of 
study on its own, especially given the relatively recent stream of gender theory. 
For the purpose of this study, though, it is important to at least try to 
comprehend the body in the context of Greek tragedy, in spite of the lack of a 
clear framework that would ascertain the conjenctures. Tragedy, through the 
centuries, has been passed down, rewritten and recontextualized multiple times 
after its emergence in classical antiquity, and a current reading of tragedy 
cannot happen in a void of knowledge. Nor is it entirely possible to reclaim the 
Greeks’ perspective on the body without making sweeping generalizations based 
on speculative assumptions, but some useful notions do, nevertheless, come to 
light during the analysis, which will aid the advancement of the analysis in the 
following chapter and in a future project. The attempt in this chapter, then, is to 
be thorough in the study of pain in tragedy, while dealing with the impossibility 
of giving an in-depth account of the history of the body in one chapter of a 
thesis.   
 I found Jean Luc Nancy’s work entitled, quite adequately, Corpus, in 
which he affixes the physical body to its extensions, while also bringing up the 
important idea of the creation of the world through the articulation of what 
happens in the body, which echoes Elaine Scarry’s last section of The Body in 
Pain, a great starting point and guide through my abridged research while 
trying to frame pain in relation to the body. At the centre of this work is the 
idea of a body of God, which informs the tradition of discourse most employed in 
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Western scholarship. Starting from the phrase hoc est enim corpus meus, 
uttered by priests before the body and blood of Christ is imparted unto his 
followers, his exploration forks out, at times only proposing complex arguments 
related to aspects of the body in the world, at other times excogitating notions 
that have a profound impact on long-established models. In this following 
fragment, with the help of which I will start my inquiry, Nancy challenges the 
notion of the body as object and as other, and deals specifically with the subject 
at hand, the body touched by pain:  
Thus the body in pain has its own portion of clarity, equal to everyone 
else’s, and distinct. The limits of suffering provide intense evidence that a 
body in pain, far from becoming an object, is an absolutely exposed 
“subject.” Anyone who murders a body, relentlessly attacking the obvious, 
cannot know, or wishes not to know, that he only renders the “subject” –
this hoc—more clear, more unmercifully clear, with each blow.39 
By looking at the effect that pain has on the body, Nancy goes beyond the 
division that renders the body as a closed, far-away entity; rather, he looks at 
the body in pain as something that is undeniably real and present. The body, for 
Nancy, is not a closed, finite thing, which collapses unto itself, but an opening 
which is contingent on closure. Thus, the body is proven, manifestly, to be an 
explicit element that, through its exposure to pain, which is a limit of sentience, 
affirms itself in space; in fact, it becomes space (hoc). This fragment holds the 
nucleus of a crucial idea for this thesis, namely that pain, instead of weakening 
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and obscuring the suffering character and his extension, the text, exposes him, 
asservating his rootedness in reality. It does so, however, only as an effect of 
being exposed to its own limit and that of the character’s suffering. A limit, 
moreover, is not a terminus point, although it does necessitate a certain kind of 
demarcation against which it can be construed. Rather, it is a sort of rupture in 
both reality and representation. An exposure to the limit is also an exposure to 
the demarcation. Here, this exposure is useful in tracing back the steps that 
lead, from a contemporarily-contextualized reading of tragedy, to a more 
truthful experience of examination. This means that, instead of arguing against 
the dualist tradition, it would be more valuable to use it in order to disclose the 
limit in the body and text that pain exposes. Nancy also argues that this is a 
necessary process in order to guard against the common mistake of artificially 
treating the body as a unity:   
 We have to do justice to the ugly Cartesian dualism, Platonic and 
Christian in origin, that opposes the soul to the body, because we won’t 
respond to the injunction that comes to us in the form of a body if, as 
contraband and in the name of a “unity” of soul and body, we put the soul 
back in the place of the body. At any rate, when we speak about the body, 
we are soon all too ready to reject, to “excrete” something (bad, 
“material”...), by denouncing, for example, the “objectified body.” (…) 
Machines are reputed to be inhuman, soulless, and bad for the body, even 
though at the same time we’re quite content to use them. In wanting to 
keep a “good,” “signifying” body, we reproduce the same schema of the 
exclusion of the body by the soul. Through the appeal or injunction of 
what falls under the name of body, we must first of all (…) restore 
something of the dualism, in the precise sense that we have to think that 
the body is not a monist unity (as opposed to the dualist vision), having 
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the immediacy and self-immanence with which we earlier endowed the 
soul.40 
While in the first-quoted passage Nancy argues that the body, when exposed to 
pain, is asserted as real and affirmed as a subject rather than as an object, he 
subsequently warns against the deceitful attempt to replace the body with 
something else (here: a soul), in order to keep it whole. Nancy takes the clue 
from the dualist tradition, which I will look at in what follows, in order to create 
space for the body itself, rather than erase it by replacing it with another, 
righteous notion. He writes about the body as opposed to mass, which would be 
impenetrable, but this is how the notion of body emerges when it is opposed to a 
soul. Mass, for the discussion of which Nancy takes the clue from Aristotle’s 
ὑ,οκεί/ενον (substance), is a thing that collapses unto itself, rather than the 
body, which is affirmed and opens up when it is touched from outside of its 
confines. The body, then, is articulated from the outside rather than delineated 
and contained in the opposition with a notion of soul. Although Nancy does not 
encourage staying within a tradition of dualism, he does take the clue from 
Plato and Descartes (mainly) when he talks about different aspects of the body 
and especially, he integrates the language that is used traditionally to talk 
about the body in order to expose another notion, one that is not dogmatic. Since 
flesh and skin are both parts of the body itself and its extensions, it follows that 
the body is enunciated especially at its limit and the limit is touched through 
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exposure to exteriority. The contention between interior-exterior is one that I 
will come back to when discussing the ermitic space of Philoctetes, the wounded 
hero. But for now, it is important to dab into the tradition that sustains the 
notions of duality, particularly the body-soul dualism, in order to be able to 
articulate what follows after—the Greek body that is full of hidden corners and 
integrated in its context because of its own resistance to being framed by 
notions that are imposed on it. In what follows, I will critically consider both the 
Platonic and Cartesian dualist notions, since the two inform each other in 
critical theory and the writing of the physical body. In addition to this, I will be 
looking, throughout this chapter, at how pain informs and breaks these notions, 
as well as briefly discussing the notion of the divine body and how this relates to 
tragedy. 
2.1 Dualism: Descartes  
Thus, a proper investigation of the frame of reference concerning the body 
within the context of ancient tragedy must compare the Greeks’ notion of the 
body—both human and divine with both the Cartesian and Platonic ideas. In 
his work on mind-body relationships (which is to say mainly in the Meditations), 
Descartes suggests a dualistic solution. According to him, although the mind 
and body are joined within the same person, they are treated as separate and 
often divergent entities in reference to one another. In the Sixth Meditation, 
Descartes argues that the body and mind are composed of essentially different 
substances and, while the mind is what constitutes being, the body is merely an 
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extension of it. Having build, during the first five Meditations, the idea that one 
cannot be sure of the existence of physical extensions of the mind, such as 
things that pertain to the senses, which can easily trick one into assessing 
objects one way or another, in the Sixth Meditation he concludes that the mind 
is the sole indivisible substance, through which he can penetrate the body:  
For this reason, from the fact that I know that I exist and that at the 
same time I judge that obviously nothing else belongs to my nature or 
essence except that I am a thinking thing, I rightly conclude that my 
essence consists entirely in my being a thinking thing. And although 
perhaps (or rather, as I shall soon say, assuredly) I have a body that is 
very closely joined to me, nevertheless, because on the one hand I have a 
clear and distinct idea of myself, insofar as I am merely a thinking thing 
and not an extended thing, and because on the other hand I have a 
distinct idea of a body, insofar as it is merely an extended thing and not a 
thinking thing, it is certain that I am really distinct from my body and 
can exist without it.41 
Descartes, then, sees the body and mind as a unit, although the mind itself can 
exist on its own and is given higher status in the system than its extension in 
the physical world. The body, however, is separate from what constitutes the 
being, which is just a “thinking thing.” In this division, it becomes apparent that 
the mind is constructed in opposition to the body, although the two are joined.  
Moreover, for Descartes, thinking (as in “understanding”) is also different 
from “imagining,” and it seems that the latter is associated with things 
experienced through the senses, which get imprinted in the imagination by 
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means of memory.42 The continuation of the argument in the Sixth Meditation is 
important because it addresses exactly the issue of the sensations and 
particularly that of pain, so the following account of it is relevant here. The first 
part of his inquiry deals with assessing the things that previously he took for 
granted because he had experienced them through his senses. Such is the belief 
that the body with its parts defines his being, as well as being directed to act or 
behave a certain way by sensations and the needs based on those sensations, 
which Descartes calls “appetites,” as well as emotions. He makes a difference 
between the things he experiences internally, such as the ones mentioned 
before, and what he experiences externally, such as: “light, colors, odors, tastes, 
and sounds, on the basis of whose variety [he] distinguished the sky, the earth, 
the seas, and the other bodies, one from the other.”43 Moreover, he makes an 
important distinction between the external things in themselves and the 
qualities that he senses based on his interaction with the different objects, 
pointing out that he “could not sense any object unless it was present to a sense 
organ.”44 This is relevant because he explains that he is tricked to believe that 
the external objects are real, since what he perceives when he is exposed to the 
empirical existence of the world is more vivid than what he can imagine (as if 
this imagining can happen in a vacuum). He goes on to argue that experiencing 
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things thus made him believe that his thoughts developed afterwards, based on 
sensations, since he experienced them first. His sensations also made him 
develop the belief that he was rooted in his own body, since he reacted to his 
sensations and had grown accustomed to it. By comparison, the objects external 
to his body were not sending him any such signals. Descartes further postulates 
that the reason for his reaction to different sensations, such as pain and hunger, 
is directed by nature and habit. In the second part of the argument, he explains 
how he came to question all these convictions he previously held. Invoking the 
laws of optics (further away objects seem smaller than they actually are), he 
comes to realize that the “external senses” are not to be trusted. The “internal 
sensations”, although experienced very intensely (“For what can be more 
intimate than pain?”45) are harder for Descartes to dismiss, although he does so 
by the end of the section. After invoking the phenomenon of nervous shadowing 
(illustrated with the example of the sensation that is felt in a severed limb), he 
goes on to argue: 
The first was that everything I ever thought I sensed while awake I could 
believe I also sometimes sensed while asleep, and since I do not believe 
that what I seem to sense in my dreams comes to me from things external 
to me, I saw no reason why I should hold this belief about those things I 
seem to be sensing while awake. The second was that, since I was still 
ignorant of the author of my origin (or at least pretended to be ignorant of 
it), I saw nothing to prevent my having been so constituted by nature that 
I should be mistaken even about what seemed to me most true.46 
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Therefore, because he experiences sensations in his sleep as well, he concludes 
that he cannot trust his senses when away, since they “trick” him into believing 
that what produces sensations in his sleep is as real as concrete physical reality. 
Moreover, he does not find a counterargument to his dismissal of the world of 
senses as a false one, although he talks about a past when he did not completely 
acknowledge the presence of God and His reason for making Descartes believe 
falsely in a reality that might not be reliable. When he brings God into the 
argument, the whole discussion changes since, instead of having a polemical 
inquiry between Descartes and his own body, a third entity that has dominance 
over both is brought into the investigation. Thus he postulates that he is defined 
by his faculty of thinking and, continuing from this, that his mind and the 
qualities of the objects he perceives are made of a different “substance,” with the 
one in which his body exists being a “corporeal and extended substance,”47 from 
which he infers that, since God, who has dominance over the world, could not 
simply deceive him into believing that the corporeal things exist, therefore they 
do, indeed, exist. The extension of this argument is advanced in what follows: 
There is nothing that this nature teaches me more explicitly than that I 
have a body that is ill disposed when I feel pain, that needs food and 
drink when I suffer hunger or thirst, and the like. Therefore, I should not 
doubt that there is some truth in this. By means of these sensations of 
pain, hunger, thirst, and so on, nature also teaches that I am present in 
my body not merely in the way a sailor is present in a ship, but that I am 
most tightly joined and, so to speak, commingled with it, so much so that 
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I and the body constitute one single thing. For if this were not the case, 
then I, who am only a thinking thing, would not sense pain when the 
body is injured; rather, I would perceive the wound by means of the pure 
intellect, just as a sailor perceives by sight whether anything in his ship 
is broken.48 
So, since nature is an extension of God, sensations are a way of guiding the 
thinker as to what he (both mind and body) needs in order to survive (although 
the survival part is never discussed, but only hinted at, in the Meditations). 
This teleological argument addresses the union of the body and mind/soul and 
developing a notion of being, of ego. What Descartes seems to be doing here is, 
as I’ve stated previously, to reach the physical body through the mind; however, 
he relates to the physical body in a similar way than he does to outside objects. 
The only means of differentiation seem to be the senses. The perception of 
things (especially that of pain) is what is of interest for this study, but before 
looking at this, it is important to delve into what constitutes the ego for 
Descartes. Nancy has a different approach, expounded below, to the issue, 
which I find worth quoting and discussing, since his conclusion in the following 
excerpt advances the same exterior-interior dialectic that I was discussing 
previously: 
For Descartes himself, the famous ego (which I’m now using in place of 
the soul) is only ego by virtue of being outside itself, by touching the wax. 
And therefore, to put it in an arrogant way, I’m claiming to show that, for 
Descartes, the res cogitans is a body. Descartes knows this very well. At 
this point, we should develop everything he says about the union of the 
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soul and the body, which is evidence as strong as that of the ego sum 
itself. Ego is being outside with reference to the ego. Ego is also being a 
body. A body is sensing, but sensing such that there’s no sensing that 
wouldn’t be a “sensing one’s self.” 
To sense, we have to sense ourselves sensing-this is also a proposition of 
Aristotle that we find in the On the Soul. Body means very precisely the 
soul that feels it’s a body. Or: the soul is the name of the sensing of the 
body. We could say it with other pairs of terms: the body is the ego that 
senses itself to be other than ego. (…) The formula that sums up this 
thought would be: the inside, which senses it is outside.49 
The ego, as Nancy argues, is the projection of the body, which is reached 
through its opposition to the soul. The difference between Descartes’ mind and 
soul is another discussion that exceeds the purpose of this study; from here on, I 
will use the term “soul,” since this ties into the next conceptual system that will 
be examined in this chapter, namely Plato’s. Although the body and soul are in 
a relation of duality, they are joined, forming the ego, which, according to 
Nancy, is also a projection of the body. The physical body itself is reached 
through the soul by means of the senses. Therefore, only by means of an exterior 
projection is the body able to reach itself. To bring pain into this equation would 
mean to discuss how the body would be reached through its projection, the soul, 
by means of pain. However, intense pain would mean, most of the time, the 
dissolution of the opposition, as the cognitive act would be annulled. If pain is 
the limit of sensing, then the touching of the physical self, which is done at the 
edge between the body and its extension, is either obstructed or reinforced. It is 
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obstructed in the case of the dissolution of the ability of the body to form a 
projection through which it can reach itself and it is reinforced when this 
projection on the exterior can still be done by the intensification of the sensation 
and the assurance of the existence of the physical body. In either case, the body 
becomes, once more, exposed, while the division between the body and the soul 
would most likely actualize the existence of the body instead of providing an 
escape mechanism through which the body would be ejected. In the concrete 
instance of the suffering tragic characters, the body is still seen and felt from 
the outside for the most part, with the exception of one scene in Philoctetes, 
when the pain reaches an upper limit of sentience and the character is muted. 
Also, this is the case in the Trachiniae, when Heracles’ only effort is to beg for 
someone to kill him, so that, through the disappearance of the body, his pain 
stops as well. Otherwise, in Prometheus Bound, for example, pain is the point of 
entry into the body and the awareness of the suffering body, in this case, is the 
main objective of Zeus’ punishment.  
 Reexamining Descartes’ solution at this point, it appears that dualism 
becomes problematic especially when he brings the third entity into the 
argument, namely God. The argument that internal and external sensations, 
including pain, are God’s (or nature’s, which is subordinated to and an 
extension of God) way of letting the mind know to govern the body seems to be 
an artificial way of accounting for the gap that was previously created, when he 
argued that it is difficult for the mind to account for the existence of the body. 
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So he is aided in the joining of the two—body and its projection—by a 
teleological explanation.  
 In his final treatise, The Passions of the Soul, Descartes addresses the 
issue of the union between the body and the soul once more, by creating a 
system where the passions (six in number: admiration, love, hatred, desire, joy 
and sadness50) are the elements through which the soul and body communicate. 
The passions produce sensations in the body by means of which the soul gets to 
know how to attend to the body. Both passions and sensations are processes 
that are rooted in the physical body and through which the union of the soul 
and body is created. The Passions of the Soul is a continuation of the argument 
Descartes starts in the Meditations and its bulk is busy with classifying the 
passions. This work once more makes use of the Cartesian method of 
conceptualization and it does so by imposing a system that is designed to make 
total sense of nature. If Descartes’ definition of passions as stated in art. 27 of 
The Passions of the Soul establishes that the passions also play a role of 
intermediation between the rational sphere and the perceptions of the soul, 
especially since they are also “caused, maintained and strengthened by some 
movements of the spirits.”51 Pain challenges this idea since it is immanent and 
it actualizes the body; Descartes’ conceptual intermediation may seem 
convenient, but ultimately it is, in intention, a logical panacea. 
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 In Descartes’ system, the rational act (cogito) is posited as the central 
notion—the subject of the logical proposition—whereas the ego is a derivative 
notion, subordinate in relation to the cogito function. Descartes’ standpoint, 
then, is that of the examiner of the rational process, not that of the empirical 
analyst. This position is fundamentally divergent from the tragic one, where the 
concepts neither intermediate between realms, nor between the characters and 
their experiences, or between the spectators and the stage. Descartes’ system is, 
admittedly, the most distant in approach from the tragic one. However, this 
system is important to keep in sight, especially since it is the result of a mode of 
conceptualization that starts in classical antiquity in Greece, emerging only one 
century later than the inception of the tragic tradition. This other system of 
thought, which I will discuss subsequently, is the Platonic one. 
2.2 Plato’s Dualism 
Within the ancient context, by fifth century BC, a new notion of the soul 
had been elaborated (most notably in Plato’s Phaedo and, to a more limited 
extent, in the Republic)—that of an immortal soul, which man must, through 
different methods, detache from the body, which is transitory and perishable, in 
order to purify and attain a higher state of existence52. In the Phaedo, the 
dialogue comprising Socrates’ death by hemlock, Plato sets the ground for his 
theory of Forms, which will be further developed in the Phaedrus and the 
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Republic. Since most of the arguments in the Phaedo have as starting point the 
discussion concerning Socrates’ impending death, they are centered upon the 
condition of the soul. The main three arguments are all concerned with the 
soul’s immortality, but the one I will be looking at here is the last one, the 
argument from affinity53, which deals directly with the soul’s relation to the 
body through the senses. The tail of the argument holds the following discussion 
about the purification of the soul through the practice of philosophy: 
 “I will tell you,” he said. “For lovers of knowledge,” he said, “know that 
when philosophy takes over their soul, it is absolutely bound on all sides 
and glued to the body and is forced to contemplate existing things 
(realities) through the body as through a prison, not the things 
themselves as they are, and is wallowing in nothing but ignorance; and 
the soul, looking down, sees that the most terrible thing about the 
imprisonment is the fact that it springs from the lust of flesh, just so that, 
exceedingly, one is his own assistant in his incarceration. Then I say that 
the lovers of knowledge know that philosophy, when it takes over the soul 
when it is in this state, gently encourages it and attempts to unbind it, 
pointing out that perception through the eyes, as through the ears as 
through all other senses is full of deceit, and urging it to withdraw from 
these, except in so far as their use is necessary, and encouraging it to 
collect and gather itself within itself, and to trust nothing other than 
itself and its own understanding of abstract existence; and to contemplate 
that there is no truth other than in that which it sees otherwise and 
which is such that it varies according to the different things in which it 
appears, since everything of that kind is visible and captured by the 
senses, whereas the soul itself sees that which is not perceivable and 
apprehended by the mind. Now the soul of the philosopher truly reasons 
that it must not withstand this release, and as such, it stands removed 
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from pleasures and lusts and griefs and fears, so much as it can do so, 
reckoning that whenever anyone has violent pleasures or fears or griefs 
or lusts he suffers from them not solely what one might suppose, such as 
illness or loss of money spent for his lusts, but he suffers the greatest and 
most extreme evil and does not take it into account.” 
“What is this evil, oh Socrates?” said Cebes. 
“The evil is that the soul of all man is forced, when it takes pleasure 
exceedingly or is grieved by anything, to believe that the thing from 
which the emotion came is very vivid and very real, but it is not so: these 
objects are mostly the visible ones, is it not so?”  
“By all means.” 
“And when this happens, is the soul not exceedingly tied down by the 
body?” 
“How so?” 
“Because each pleasure or pain fastens it down as with a nail to the body 
and fastens it on and makes it corporeal, so that it deems that the things 
are true which the body says are true. For because it has the same beliefs 
and pleasures as the body it is constrained to assume the same practices 
as well and a way of life, and can never leave in purity to Hades, but 
must always go away polluted by the body; and so it falls down right 
away into another body again and grows into it, just like a seed that is 
implanted. Therefore it has no portion in the communion with the divine 
and physically clean and unique.”54 
Here, the opposition between ψυχὴ (soul) and σώµα (body) is rooted in the 
contention that the territory of the body is the antithesis of “the divine and pure 
and absolute,” which is the realm of the Forms—purified, ideal concepts. The 
soul, before the process of purification, exists in between these two planes and 
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its only chance of accessing a higher state and continuing its existence in the 
realm of the Forms is through the practice of philosophy—so through the mind, 
which trains one to be detached from the illusions created by the body, through 
the senses. Pleasure and pain, which are here given as examples of evils that 
keep the soul attached to the body, belong to the world of the corporeal 
(σωµατοειδῆ), whereas the world of the soul, which it has to work to recognize by 
cutting ties with the physical realm, is one of the divine (θείου), purity, in the 
sense of cleanliness (καθαροῦ) and simplicity or undividedness (µονοειδοῦς). 
Existence in the world of the contaminated body is seen as something that one 
would definitely avoid (at 84b Socrates goes on to classify the animal bodies of 
the reincarnated souls based on their moral wrongdoings and misconducts, such 
as donkeys for the egregious souls and hawks for the unjust ones). What is 
valuable to recognize here is also that the emotions, although capable of having 
such a great influence on the soul, are rooted in the senses, which are deceitful 
inasmuch as they give the impression that the objects perceived through them 
are true. However, this is not the deceitfulness that Descartes mentions in the 
Sixth Meditations, when he argues that the objects perceived by the senses are 
smaller or larger than they appear in reality. Rather, Socrates is arguing that 
the things observed through the senses are not to be trusted because they are 
perceived through the body “as through prison bars” and they are only shadows 
of the realities of the realm of Forms. The soul is still immortal even if it does 
not go through the purification, but it does not have access to the truth and it 
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lives in the world of projections.      
It is important to establish the similarities between the two positions, 
that of Descartes and that advanced by Plato, as they together lay the 
foundation of a position that is usually taken as a priori in pain studies, namely 
the projection of the self outside of the physical world. On this particular topic, 
Sarah Broadie writes: 
Both philosophers argue that we consist of something incorporeal, 
whether one calls it ‘mind’ or ‘soul’, which for the time being is somehow 
united with a body that is part of the physical world. Both identify the 
self, the ‘I’, with the incorporeal member of this alliance. Both hold that 
my mind or soul will survive the demise of the body (…), which in turn is 
present to me through its members’ bodies. Both may be understood as 
holding that the mind or soul can exist altogether independently of body, 
though Plato may have changed position on this point. Both are 
concerned with the immortality of the soul.55 
Moreover, both philosophers build systems that place the body in a lesser, 
deceitful and impure realm, while the soul’s attachment to it is assisted by the 
senses. The division between the body and soul is a prerequisite for both 
systems, but, while Descartes develops a theory of passions, using the concepts 
to create a unity between the body and soul, Plato regards all emotions as κακόι 
(evil). Plato, moreover, puts emphasis on a process of separation between soul 
and body, which is necessary before a definitive segregation between the two 
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can take place. The soul is, in nature, indestructible and eternal and has the 
aptitude of elevating itself. Thus, this system is fundamentally a transcendental 
one, while for Descartes, the soul’s union with the body and the ego’s rapport 
with God is established a priori conception. Hendrik Lorenz has it that for the 
Greeks, the soul is “standardly thought and spoken of (…) as the distinguishing 
mark of living things, as something that is the subject of emotional states and 
that is responsible for planning and practical thinking, and also as the bearer of 
such virtues as courage and justice.”56 It is apparent that in both systems the 
corporeal realm is polluted and the desirable thing for the human being is to at 
least be able to distinguish between what is bodily and what rational or abstract 
and belongs to the world of the soul and the divine.   
Both philosophers use strong scornful language when describing the body 
(Plato more so than Descartes), so reading these theoretical texts next to the 
tragic ones exposes the discrepancy between the two approaches. Plato’s and 
Descartes’ theoretical systems advance concepts that put the body at a distance, 
so that one can mediate between different realms and entities. Thus, the body is 
never actualized, although, as I was arguing in the first pages of this chapter 
with the aid of Nancy’s Corpus, one can meet the body at its limit between the 
physical realm and the cogito act or between the corporeal and the Ideas in 
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Plato’s terms. Considering the soul-body dualism here is not meant to advance 
an antithetical idea of oneness because this would not necessarily help in 
approaching the pained body in tragedy, but because it is valuable to recognize 
that the manufacturing of conceptual systems is inconsistent with both the 
tragic sphere and with the posture that the body is in when experiencing 
intense pain. After dealing with Aristotle’s system of classification, a look at 
Plato’s and Descartes’ synthetic schemes facilitates a process of conceptual 
deconstruction, and exposes the need to set these systems aside when 
approaching the core of the issue: pain in tragedy.   
The notion of the body in tragedy does not to spring from soul-body 
dualism; corporeality in this context seems to be contiguous to the archaic 
manner of positing the body, which, as Fulton explains, is not rooted in a split: 
The fact is that in the archaic period Greek “corporeity” still does not 
acknowledge a body/soul distinction, nor does it establish a radical break 
between the natural and supernatural. Man’s corporeality also includes 
organic realities, vital forces, psychic activities, divine inspiration or 
influxes. The same word can refer to these various domains. On the other 
hand, there is no term that designates the body as an organic unity, 
which supports the individual in the multiplicity of his vital and mental 
functions.57 
This view of the body can likewise be applied to how the body is represented in 
tragedy. Especially in the cases of the suffering heroes of the three tragedies I 
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am discussing in the following chapter, the body is represented through its 
parts or extensions: in the case of Prometheus by his chains and liver, in 
Philoctetes’ case by his foot, wound and bloody bandages and in Heracles’ case 
by the poisoned cloak and his pained limbs. It is true that this occurs in the text 
also due to the characters’ exposure to pain, which splits the attention and 
directs it to the spot in the body where it occurs or to the object that provokes it, 
but this would not be expressed thus in a text which belongs to a tradition 
rooted in the soul-body division. The prevalence of pain in tragedy signals the 
poets’ preoccupation with the experience of pain and with what can be induced 
or gained by the public through the exposure to it. It is also possible that the 
tragic poets were aware of the ideological current that advanced the body-soul 
division and were addressing the issue through the representation of pain on 
stage. Their understanding of the mechanisms of pain, incontestable given 
especially its primacy in the tragedies I am commenting on in the third chapter, 
challenges through simple exposure any such system, for in pain, any mind-
body division, no matter how firmly pre-established a Platonic or Cartesian 
system of conceptualization might be, is shaken, as Drew Leder also argues: 
…such an account is profoundly challenged by the experience of pain. For 
in pain we find the unity of the mental and corporeal. The bodily 
sensation is intimately intertwined with an emotional and existential 
meaning. This unity has a linguistic representation: the word “pain” itself 
can be used to describe not only physical, but emotional or cognitive 
suffering.” It is not only the unity of mind and body that pain reveals, but 
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also another duality: between the patient, or the one in pain, and the 
external world.58 
Leder discusses here the effect that pain has on the body in terms of a “unity,” 
which is not a notion that I advance in relation to tragedy. However, the more 
important idea that transpires from this passage is the fact that in instances of 
intense pain, the mind-body or soul-body division ceases to make sense. If, then, 
one deems the soul as the purified extension of the body and the ideal version of 
man, pain reminds one that such a projection is inconsistent with the human 
being in its natural surroundings. Through the raw experience of pain, the body 
is once more actualized, it becomes real and present—a purification of the body 
in opposition to the soul. Ancient tragedians, it seems, are well aware of this 
fact and instead of employing a system that purifies the soul and does not allow 
it to be exposed to the pain that “nails it as with a nail to the body and rivets it 
on and makes it corporeal,”59 they expose the body, bringing it in focus and 
positing it as subject through pain. 
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Chapter 3: 
The Limits of Pain: Pain in Prometheus Bound, Philoctetes and 
Trachiniae 
Never has Zeus, the king of all things, 
granted to mortals life without pain; 
but grief and happiness come  
       to every man in his turn,  
like the circling paths of the Bear. 
  Sophocles, Trachiniae 
 
This chapter offers several interpretations of pain in the three plays of the 
corpus through a hermeneutical method of analysis in light of the notion of 
limit. These readings build on concepts that I discussed in the previous two 
chapters, where I showed why it is necessary to liberate oneself from the burden 
of a mimetic and a dualist conceptual system when approaching the ancient 
tragic tradition. Although the choice of a hermeneutical method of analysis may 
seem overly ambitious here, this approach is chosen deliberately as means of 
countering the above-mentioned systems of conceptualization. Tying in with a 
tradition of interpretation that antedates Platonic philosophy, hermeneutical 
analysis puts the interpreter in the position of “a translator, a mediator, who 
uses his linguistic knowledge to make intelligible what is not understood, what 
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is no longer understood.”60 Peter Szondi’s Introduction to Literary Hermeneutics 
outlines a tradition of literary hermeneutics in juxtaposition with philosophical 
hermeneutics, which gained theoretical ground in the twentieth century, under 
the influence of Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer, who are building on a shift in 
hermeneutics initiated by Romantic German philosopher and theologian 
Friedrich Schleiermacher. In his work Hermeneutics and Criticism, making a 
switch from theological hermeneutics to general textual hermeneutics, 
Schleiermacher lays down the rules for a modern hermeneutical method, 
underlying the relation between hermeneutics, criticism and grammar:   
Hermeneutics and criticism, both philological disciplines, both theories, 
belong together, because the practice of one presupposes the other. The 
former is generally the art of understanding particularly the written 
discourse of another person correctly, the latter the art of judging 
correctly and establishing the authenticity of texts and parts of texts from 
adequate evidence and data. (…) In the same way as hermeneutics and 
criticism belong together, so too do they both belong together with 
grammar.61  
This passage opens the ground for the two main axes of hermeneutical inquiry: 
the grammatical the psychological. The former dimension of interpretation, the 
grammatical one, building on the notion of the sensus litteralis of ancient 
hermeneutics, through which the hermeneutician seeks to find the meaning of 
the words that form the text, comprises the famous hermeneutical circle, which 
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Schleiermacher introduces thus: “[c]omplete knowledge is always in this 
apparent circle, that each particular can only be understood via the general, of 
which it is a part, and vice-versa. And every piece of knowledge is only scientific 
if it is formed in this way.”62 Therefore, in order to properly understand the text 
according to Schleiermacher’s grammatical method, the hermeneutician must 
be prepared to see both the historical and cultural context of the text and its 
textual details at the level of the word—a move between the two is necessary for 
an authentic interpretation.63 The psychological axis of hermeneutical 
interpretation, namely the psychological one, is famous for its often-criticized 
concept of authorial intent, which Schleiermacher explains thus:  
The task is also to be expressed as follows, to understand the utterance at 
first just as well and then better than its author. For because we have no 
immediate knowledge of what is in him, we must seek to bring much to 
consciousness that can remain unconscious to him, except to the extent to 
which he himself reflectively becomes his own reader.64 
This type of interpretation is an effort to understand and bring to light what the 
author meant, but it also a divinatory practice for the hermeneutician, meaning 
a method “in which one, so to speak, transforms oneself into the other person 
and tries to understand the individual element directly.”65 I am choosing to give 
an account of Schleiermacher’s set of rules for hermeneutical analysis not 
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because I will follow them closely, but because his method ties in with the 
ancient one of divination—the interpretation of the Oracle’s message. This 
method, in turn, is also more in line with the practice of rhetoric, which 
Schleiermacher also links to the hermeneutical method: “The belonging together 
of hermeneutics and rhetoric consists in the fact that every act of understanding 
is the inversion of a speech-act, during which the thought which was the basis of 
the speech must become conscious.”66 The rhetorical tradition, which Plato 
slanders in his dialogues, is, therefore, rooted in the speech act and grants the 
space necessary for an interpretation of the hermeneutical type, as opposed to 
Plato’s system, which does not. I choose to align myself, then, to this tradition 
when exercising a hermeneutical methodology not in its strictly 
Schleiermachian sense, but rather in its original denotation, indicated by the 
word’s etymological root: ἑρµηνεύς—interpreter, expounder.  
 Interpreting texts “in their totality” and doing so in relation to only one 
instance or concept, such as pain, is different in what concerns the 
hermeneutical process—there is, simultaneously, a process of contextualization 
of the moment itself in the play, the play in the cultural and historical 
circumstance, but also constantly connecting the pain in the text to human pain 
in general. Because pain is universal, the last part of the task is made easier; it 
is, in fact, one of the main reasons for its inclusion in tragedy and for the 
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attention granted it in the three plays that I am analyzing. There is, in tragedy 
and elsewhere, a singular pain—it differs in causes and effects, but the core is 
always the same. 
 Not only is this hermeneutical analysis focused on the notion of pain, but, 
in what follows, I will be framing the notion of pain in relation to that of the 
limit. This notion was already discussed to some extent in the second chapter, in 
relation to Nancy’s contention that through pain, a limit is reached which 
exposes the body as a subject. Besides discussing the concrete limits of space, 
sentience and language in relation to pain, I am also exposing the ways in 
which pain in tragedy tests various limits and constitutes a point of entry into 
the body, through which another dimension is accessed. There is, indeed, an 
esoteric implication in this contention, which cannot be avoided when talking 
about a tradition such as the tragic one after connecting it to pre-Socratic 
thought. Although one cannot establish with certainty what the relationship 
between the public, stage and the spiritual message of the tragedies was in fifth 
century BC, a hermeneutic understanding, while keeping track of the context of 
the plays, is certainly more valuable than a purely historical or philological 
reading, which would align the tragic tradition to a Platonic and Aristotelian 
one, draining it of all intensity.  
 I also want to advance the idea of pain as the limit of life—the moment 
when the sufferer can come as close as possible to death while still alive. This 
type of exposure would be, for the Greeks, both a moment of purification and 
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one of illumination. About purification in relation to the fire element, Peter 
Kingsley writes in his book Ancient Philosophy, Mystery and Magic, which had 
significant influence on this project in its developing stages, writes: “[t]he idea 
of fire as purifying—and immortalizing—became so deeply imbedded in the 
consciousness of the Greeks that even at their most facetious they were unable 
to escape it.”67 I am using the same idea in my analysis, while replacing fire 
with pain. Seeing pain as the purifying element would take the physical body 
out of the action-object relationship it is in Plato’s system, when the argument 
of the purification of the body and the detachment of the soul from the body is 
advanced, such as in Phaedo. Instead, pain in tragedy is imminent, while its 
circumstances and consequences cannot be controlled or organized into a set of 
rules. With these ideas in the background, I will start the foray into the texts of 
the three plays of the corpus.     
3.1 Prometheus Bound 
One play where fire and pain are connected in a rapport of cause-and-effect 
is Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, where the pro-Olympian god is tied to a rock 
in distant land, in Scythia, Central Asia, a land of the ξένοι (foreigners) as 
Kratos’ opening lines describe:  
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To68 earth’s remotest part we come, to the Scythian land, an untrodden 
solitude.69 
Here, since the play is with and about immortals, the limit is defined through 
space and the space is an extension of Prometheus’ situation and suffering. I 
will discuss the relevance of a space of isolation in relation to pain as it appears 
in Philoctetes, but it is important to note that, since this is the opening to 
Prometheus Bound, the entrance into the situation of pain is done through 
space, by carrying out Prometheus’ bounding outside the city, in a deserted 
place where the sufferer cannot exercise agency or relate to anything of 
importance in a social context. The space of solitude, untrodden and desolate 
(ἄβατον) is a reflection of the hero’s suffering, but also, in the case of 
Prometheus, the place of torture.  
3.1.1 Godly Bodies 
The story of Parometheus’ wrongdoings is told in reverse: in the opening 
scene the hero is already being punished by Zeus’ intermediants, Bia and 
Kratos (Force and Power) for crimes that have been commited previously. 
Before advancing, it is important to note that, while until now I discussed the 
human body in the thought of Plato, Descartes and the pre-Socratics, here the 
punished one is a god—immortal, but still vulnerable—hero. In his essay Dim 
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Body, Dazzling Body, Jean-Pierre Vernant poses an important question: “The 
body of gods. How does this expression pose a problem for us? Can gods who 
have two bodies—antropomorphic gods like those of the ancient Greeks—really 
be considered gods?”70 In the case of Prometheus Bound, this is an essential 
question, since Prometheus is a powerful god, yet susceptible to punishment 
and torture by Zeus, the newly appointed ruler of Olympus. Prometheus’ myth 
is given a lot of importance and lines in Hesiod’s Theogony as well (almost one 
hundred lines), where he is responsible for both bestowing fire on the mortals 
and for their misfortunes, sent to them as punishment by Zeus through the 
deceptive and unfortunate Pandora. Prometheus is, in Hesiod, in between the 
two worlds (the human and the divine) and between two roles (that of 
benefactor and wrongdoer), but in Prometheus Bound, he is not associated with 
Pandora, so he is a lawbreaker only according to Zeus’ system of justice. This 
god-human duality in terms of the body seems to resemble the body-soul one in 
Plato and Descartes, but when considered in light of the pre-Socratics, such as 
Xenophones, whose take on the matter Vernant discusses in his essay, the 
distinction is defined in other terms than the dualist ones: 
In order to traverse the gulf separating god and man, Xenophanes is not 
led to oppose the corporeal to the noncorporeal, to an immateriality, a 
pure Spirit; for him, it is enough to acknowledge the contrast between the 
constant and the changing, the immutable and the mutable, the 
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perfection of that which remains eternally accomplished in the plenitude 
of itself, and the incompleteness and imperfection of that which is 
divided, dispersed, partial, transitory, perishable.71  
If the fundamental difference between the divine and human body is 
immortality and permanence on the divine side, then Prometheus’ position as 
victim of Zeus’ unrelenting retribution in Prometheus Bound addresses exactly 
this issue: the suffering of an immortal god, who is not in danger of dying, but is 
still exposed to pain. Prometheus’ pain does not seem to be alleviated in any 
way by the fact that he is a god. In fact, he repeatedly refers, complaining about 
his treatment by Zeus and the abuse that he, himself a god, is subjected to for a 
deed that, to him, seems perfectly ethical. Moreover, he expresses that his 
immortality is amplifying his pain (by the thought of an eternal pain, that 
cannot be ended by death) when he is confronted with Io, who is a mortal: 
Io 
What gain have I then in life? Why did I not hurl myself straightaway 
from this rugged rock, so that I was dashed to earth and freed from all 
my sufferings? It is better to die once and for all than linger out all my 
days in misery. 
 
Prometheus 
Ah, you would hardly bear my agonies to whom it is not foredoomed to 
die; for death would have freed me from my sufferings. But now no limit 
to my tribulations has been appointed until Zeus is hurled from his 
sovereignty.72 
For Io, there is still the option of death, which she can choose, so her agency is 
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not completely severed. Prometheus, however, does not have such a luxury. He 
is thus in a position which demands the tragic spectator’s attention, who can 
empathize with his suffering, which makes him more pitiful than a human. But 
still, the question remains of Zeus’ authority, who makes a point by punishing 
Prometheus in order to assert his power. The play seems to have an implicit 
subversive thread running through it, but in terms of the notion of pain, it 
appears that there is a process that Prometheus has to go through in order to 
authenticate Zeus’ system of law in the two worlds, which he has disturbed, but 
also to expose the fact that inexhaustible vital energy, attemporality and sacred 
existence are not tested by death, but by pain. The limit that exposes the body, 
human or divine, is not that of life, but that of pain—here inflicted through 
torture, isolation, oppression and the removal of agency.  
3.1.2 Torture 
Thus, the imposition of order, substantiated through torture, is what makes 
pain for Prometheus undeniably concrete. This is also made clear from the 
beginning of the play, in Kratos’ order to Hephaestos: 
And now, Hephaestus, yours is the charge to observe the mandates laid 
upon you by the Father—to clamp this miscreant upon the high craggy 
rocks in shackles of binding adamant that cannot be broken. For your 
own flower, flashing fire, source of all arts, he has purloined and 
bestowed upon mortal creatures. Such is his offence; for this he is bound 
to make requital to the gods, so that he may learn to bear with the 
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sovereignty of Zeus and cease his man-loving ways.73 
Zeus’ punishment is carried through Kratos, Bia and Hephaestus, all 
immortals, and, while the first two are willing participants in the torture, 
Hephaestus is reluctant and fearful. The language used by Kratos to describe 
Prometheus, especially the pejorative λεωργόν (a villan) establishes the 
structure of torture from the first lines. As Elaine Scarry notes, there are two 
aspects of torture, both of which are exemplified here, in Kratos’ command, 
namely a physical act and a verbal one.74 In this example, the action of inflicting 
pain is expressed through the verb ὀχµάσαι (infinitive aorist of ὀχµάζω—to grip, 
bind; also used in relation to binding animals in Euripides) and through the 
emphatic description of the instrument of torture: ἀδαµαντίνων δεσµῶν ἐν 
ἀρρήκτοις πέδαις75 (unbroken fetters of adamant chains). The verbal part of 
torture is carried out through the reiteration of the reason for the torture and 
the reinforcement of Zeus’ authority. Prometheus, who is silent throughout the 
first part, where a reluctant Hephaestus is binding him, is subjected to the 
torture without being interrogated directly. This annuls his voice, but also 
implies his lack of direct interaction with the agents of power—he is not allowed 
to appeal his treatment. After the binding is completed and Kratos and Bia are 
not on stage, Prometheus is given a voice and he can narrate his own story, 
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which he does twice—fonce or the Oceanids and once for Io. His story and 
interactions with the Chorus, Ocean and Io expose an organization of powers 
which justifies his actions, but also depict him as a vulnerable, suffering victim 
of a new, power-hungry ruler:   
As soon as he had seated himself upon his father’s throne, he 
immediately assigned to the deities their several privileges and 
apportioned to them their proper powers. But of wretched mortals he took 
no notice, desiring to bring the whole race to an end and create a new one 
in its place. Against this purpose none dared make stand except me— I 
only had the courage; I saved mortals so that they did not descend, 
blasted utterly, to the house of Hades. This is why I am bent by such 
grievous tortures, painful to suffer, piteous to behold. I who gave mortals 
first place in my pity, I am deemed unworthy to win this pity for myself, 
but am in this way mercilessly disciplined, a spectacle that shames the 
glory of Zeus.76 
While in Hesiod’s Works and Days Prometheus’ punishment is depicted in order 
to show how a mighty Zeus punishes his unruly subordinates, here he is the 
new despot, who abuses his powers in order to impose his new rule. The central 
element in Prometheus’ story is pity, by means of which he differentiates 
himself from Zeus. Scarry argues that it is precisely in the case of unstable, new 
power that acts of cruelty such as torture are most prevalent:  
The physical pain is so incontestably real that it seems to confer its 
quality of “incontestable reality” on that power that has brought it into 
being. It is, of course, precisely because the reality of that power is so 
highly contestable, the regime so unstable, that torture is being used.77 
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When a regime is new (and, thus, unstable), turture is inflicted not on random 
citizens, but to those who constitute a danger for the regime. Prometheus’ story 
in Prometheus Bound differs from the one told by Hesiod, although Aeschylus 
takes his inspiration from Hesiod’s account. Prometheus is a Titan here, the son 
of Ge. Why would Prometheus, through granting humans fire, be a danger to 
Zeus is difficult to answer directly, but Mark Griffith tries an explanation that 
is consistent with the play: 
Along with P.’s new parentage come two major innovations, both 
involving P.’s knowledge of the future. First, the dramatist has 
transferred to P. the role performed by Ge in Hesiod’s Titanomachy, that 
of providing the crucial advice which enabled Zeus and the Olympians to 
defeat the Titans (…). Secondly, P. is now endowed with a further piece of 
knowledge upon which the survival of Zeus’ rule depends. The origin of 
this motif may lie in Hesiod’s account of Zeus’ marriage with Metis, and 
the birth of Athena, in which Ge again provided vital advice (Th. 886-
900); but the more immediate source appears to be Pind. I. 8. 27ff (…) 
where Themis saves Zeus and Poseidon from trying to marry Thetis, by 
telling them of the prophecy that Thetis will bear a son mightier than his 
father (so the gods marry her off to Peleus). In combining this motif with 
the story of P., the author of Prom. has added a new dimension to the 
struggle between P. and Zeus: indeed, P.’s foreknowledge becomes the key 
to the resolution of the whole drama.78  
Griffith alludes to the fact that Prometheus’ stealing of the fire is not the sole 
reason for Zeus’ wrath. Whatever his motives are, there is definitely not much 
said in Prometheus Bound by any of the characters to project a benevolent 
image of Zeus. He is depicted as a severe and cruel ruler, especially after Io’s 
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account of her misfortunes, at 640-686, where Zeus’ lust is the cause of all her 
suffering. But in Aeschylus’ play, all gods are compassionate to Prometheus’ 
fate, which raises several questions. There is no account in the whole play, other 
than in the beginning, in Kratos’ orders, where Zeus’ actions are condoned. All 
characters who come in contact with Prometheus are sympathetic to the hero 
and, while fearful, they never explicitly agree with Zeus’ punishment. In fact 
the Chorus, comprised of Oceanus’ daughters, uses harsh words to condemn 
Zeus’ behaviour and the way in which he exercises his power:  
Chorus 
Who of the gods is so hard of heart as to exult in this? Who does not 
sympathize with your woes—save only Zeus? But he in malice, has set his 
soul inflexibly and keeps in subjection the race sprung from Uranus; nor 
will he stop, until he has satiated his soul or another seizes his 
impregnable empire by some device of guile.79 
By emphasizing the harshness of Zeus’ rule, the effect obtained is that 
Prometheus, and along with him the whole human race (whose well-being is the 
reasons for the hero’s suffering, so the public, in connecting with Prometheus, is 
“bound” to feel some guilt), is subjected to Zeus’ harsh rule and is in danger of 
suffering the same as the hero. Although Prometheus’ suffering is intense and 
his indignation even more so, the narration of his story seems to alleviate some 
of the pain, for he is convinced that what he has done to save the human race is 
justified. Moreover, since he can foresee the future, he is even aluding to a 
future clemency act towards Zeus. Prometheus’ sufferings and Zeus’ torture all 
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function within a system, which they both know well. It seems that in this 
system Zeus is not the all-powerful ruler that Hesiod portrays.   
 
3.1.3 Ananke 
As I was discussing in the second chapter of this thesis, one notion that 
binds many of the tragic elements together is that of ananke—necessity. The 
gods are also subjected to this system and Prometheus, who has the gift of 
foresight, knows well that there is an end to his ordeal and that Zeus is not 
completely in charge of Prometheus’ fate. Although Prometheus is bound to 
suffer in space, in his present, he is still able to come out of the moment of his 
suffering and project himself to a future where the situation is changed and he 
is no longer in a vulnerable position, tied to a rock. Such moments, contrasted 
with those moments during which he is completely subjected to the now of the 
pain, contextualize and explain a world where things are everchanging, even for 
gods. Several narratives are used to explain and alleviate pain. Such is this 
account, which, through a projection in the future, Prometheus counters the 
harshness of a despotic Zeus in the present with a wiser, more humane ruler: 
Prometheus 
I know that Zeus is harsh and keeps justice in his own hands; but 
nevertheless one day his judgement will soften, when he has been 
crushed in the way that I know. Then, calming down his stubborn wrath, 
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he shall at last bond with me in union and friendship, as eager as I am to 
welcome him.80 
According to this, Zeus himself, through the necessity of suffering, will be 
transformed and will create a bond with the Titan whom he is now torturing. 
Since foresight allows Prometheus to access whichever point he chooses on the 
time axis, his pain is also put in perspective. However, pain, when it is intense, 
binds one fully to the present moment, so the fact that Prometheus is able to 
look into the future means that he is either not in intense physical pain or that 
he has passed a limit of pain through which he is able to function in a liminal 
space and time. In Prometheus’ case, I would argue that the former is the case, 
since his pain, although hard to endure and extended throughout a long period 
of time is never expressed as intensely as Io’s pain.  
While on the subject of ananke, one may wonder whether there is such an 
idea in tragedy as a necessity of pain. In Prometheus’ case, his suffering is not 
contextualized in order to explain such a necessity, but he does give an account 
of his reasons for the crime that put him in chains: 
Prometheus 
No, do not think it is from pride or even from wilfulness that I am silent. 
Painful thoughts devour my heart as I behold myself maltreated in this 
way. And yet who else but I definitely assigned their prerogatives to 
these upstart gods? But I do not speak of this; for my tale would tell you 
nothing except what you know. Still, listen to the miseries that beset 
mankind—how they were witless before and I made them have sense and 
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endowed them with reason. I will not speak to upbraid mankind but to 
set forth the friendly purpose that inspired my blessing. 
First of all, though they had eyes to see, they saw to no avail; they had 
ears, but they did not understand; but, just as shapes in dreams, 
throughout their length of days, without purpose they wrought all things 
in confusion. They had neither knowledge of houses built of bricks and 
turned to face the sun nor yet of work in wood; but dwelt beneath the 
ground like swarming ants, in sunless caves. They had no sign either of 
winter or of flowery spring or of fruitful summer, on which they could 
depend but managed everything without judgment, until I taught them to 
discern the risings of the stars and their settings, which are difficult to 
distinguish. 
Yes, and numbers, too, chiefest of sciences, I invented for them, and the 
combining of letters, creative mother of the Muses’ arts, with which to 
hold all things in memory. I, too, first brought brute beasts beneath the 
yoke to be subject to the collar and the pack-saddle, so that they might 
bear in men’s stead their heaviest burdens; and to the chariot I harnessed 
horses and made them obedient to the rein, to be an image of wealth and 
luxury. It was I and no one else who invented the mariner’s flaxen-
winged car that roams the sea. 
Wretched that I am—such are the arts I devised for mankind, yet have 
myself no cunning means to rid me of my present suffering.81 
Prometheus is the intermediary between the heaven and earth; he is also the 
patron of the arts on Earth—he creates, in human physical terms, a world that 
did not exist and for this he must suffer. However, while he has the power to 
help the human race and create a new world, which, depicted in these verses 
resembles a utopia, he is not capable of liberating himself from a breaking-down 
of his own world through pain. The world that Prometheus is proud to have 
created is developed in corporeal terms first, then in the extensions of the 
bodies. The human world is an undefined mass that Prometheus shapes into an 
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orderly universe, but he must suffer for his creation. He appears, here, as a self-
effacing humanitarian. However, as he is in great suffering because of his 
actions, he is also, so to speak, the sufferer of those actions. While he is telling 
his story, Zeus’ rule is gradually left in the background and another narrative 
emerges: that of the necessity of suffering. To suffer as an effect of an action is 
to be objected to that action. Pain, however, brings actuality and presence back, 
taking the sufferer out of the equation. After exercising his power and creating 
a world, setting this newly-created world to be the object that is being 
constructed and organized, Prometheus is himself objectified by Zeus through 
torture. Prometheus recognizes that ananke is such that gods and humans alike 
must abide by its rules, as he explains bellow:  
Chorus 
Do not benefit mortals beyond reason and disregard your own distress; 
although, I am confident that you will be freed from these bonds and will 
have power in no way inferior to Zeus. 
 
Prometheus 
Not in this way is Fate, who brings all to fulfillment, destined to complete 
this course. Only when I have been bent by pangs and tortures infinite 
am I to escape my bondage. Skill is weaker by far than Necessity. 
 
Chorus 
Who then is the helmsman of Necessity? 
 
Prometheus 
The three-shaped Fates and mindful Furies. 
 
Chorus 
Can it be that Zeus has less power than they do? 
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Prometheus 
Yes, in that even he cannot escape what is foretold. 
Chorus 
Why, what is fated for Zeus except to hold eternal sway? 
 
Prometheus 
This you must not learn yet; do not be over-eager. 
 
Chorus 
It is some solemn secret, surely, that you enshroud in mystery. 
 
Prometheus 
Think of some other subject, for it is not the proper time to speak of this. 
No matter what, this must be kept concealed; for it is by safeguarding it 
that I am to escape my dishonorable bonds and outrage.82 
Zeus, Prometheus, Io, all mortals and everyone else are subjected to ananke, but 
as I was explaining in the first chapter, necessity does not have a set of clear 
rules; nor do we, readers, have enough information to build a system of 
necessity in tragedy. Moreover, ananke is not a concept that intermediates, that 
gives access to an abstract notion or space. Here, it seems that necessity is used 
to expose the vulnerability, or even finiteness of both gods and humans—it is a 
mysterious entity that does not allow aggrandizing self-projections, nor inflated 
egos, such as Zeus’, to rule in confidence for too long. It is a concept that, 
together with pain, transcends extensions, bringing back the concrete, the real. 
3.1.4 Pathei Mathos 
Another idea in light of which Prometheus’ and Io’s sufferings can be 
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interpreted is πάθει µάθος, or learning through suffering. This following passage 
in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon illustrates the concept, but he applies it to mortals 
only: 
Zeus, who sets mortals on the path to understanding, Zeus, who has 
established as a fixed law that “wisdom comes by suffering.” But even as 
trouble, bringing memory of pain, drips over the mind in sleep, so wisdom 
comes to men, whether they want it or not.83 
Here, Zeus is the one who imparts the suffering through which understanding is 
achieved—so a process of exposure to suffering that leads to wisdom. In 
Prometheus’ case, his pain does not lead to understanding—there is no process 
through which he achieves greater wisdom. Nor is there such a process of 
suffering through which higher understanding and, perhaps, the alleviation of 
pain could be acheieved, in the case of Io. In fact, Io’s final lines express the 
pinnacle of pain in the whole play. As she goes off to continue her wanderings, 
she wails: 
Io 
Oh! Oh! Alas! Once again convulsive pain and frenzy, striking my brain, 
inflame me. I am stung by the gadfly’s barb, unforged by fire. My heart 
knocks at my ribs in terror; my eyeballs roll wildly round and round. I am 
carried out of my course by a fierce blast of madness; I’ve lost all mastery 
over my tongue, and a stream of turbid words beats recklessly against the 
billows of wretched doom.84 
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Io’s character in Prometheus Bound has been discussed widely85 and her role in 
the play is not the focus of this discussion, but her pain does bring up several 
important points. Since, as I noted above, her pain seems to be more intense 
that Prometheus’, but she does have the alternative of death, she is, in a 
grotesque shape and state, the epiphany of suffering in the three plays I am 
analyzing. However, her condition is such that she cannot learn from it; there is 
no pathei mathos, no positivist notion of suffering to be brought forth here. I 
conclude, in relation to the much-vehiculated notion of learning through 
adversity in Greek tragedy that Aeschylus did not mean to depict pain as a 
process of understanding. It is possible, however, that both he and Sophocles 
saw pain as an element of purification from ambition or projection outside of the 
body. Io, for instance, is a beautiful maiden, on the brink of sexual maturation, 
who is metamorphosed into a cow and subjected to constant pain and endless 
wanderings: a most cruel punishment. But through her pain, she is able to 
access the στυγνῆς κύµασιν ἄτης (the billows of wretched doom), which seems to 
refer to Hades or to death. Io’s pain can be seen as purifying by touching the 
limits of everything that is corporeal function. However, this fragment comes 
after Prometheus’ account of her future, which gives hope—so her pain is 
contextualized differently, although she is constantly testing the limits of life in 
her condition.     
                                                
85 For example in Stephen White, “Io’s World: Intimations of Theodicy in Prometheus 
Bound,” The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 121 (2001): 107-140. 
85 
 
3.2 Philoctetes 
Philoctetes is Sophocles’ play that focuses on the main character’s pain. 
Philoctetes is not a Greek hero in the traditional sense. In this play, he is 
defined against Odysseus, who plays the role of a cunning diplomat, sending 
Neoptolemus to steal the bow from its rightful owner. The explanation is that 
the greater cause, the state of a nation, is more important than Philoctetes’ fate. 
Adamantly, the hero refuses to join Odysseus, whom he has a great deal of 
enmity towards, after he had been abandoned on a deserted island, with a puss-
infected wound on his foot, by the Homeric hero. Philoctetes is the suffering 
hero par excellence, but there is nothing majestic or heroic in his pain. However, 
because he is none of these things (a warrior, conqueror, diplomat, etc.), he is 
the personification of the humbled hero; pain has taught him the opposite of the 
narcissistic grandeur of the epic hero. He is always about to have an attack of 
pain, so he does not spend more energy that he must in order to feed himself 
and survive. He is stuck on the island of Lemnos, forlorn at the end of the world. 
3.2.1 The Eremitic Space 
In the opening lines of Philoctetes, when Odysseus introduces the suffering 
body of the hero and makes very clear his strangeness, by placing him in the 
deserted land of Lemnos, he says, speaking to Neoptolemus: 
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This86 is the coast of the land of sea-girt Lemnos, a land untrodden by 
men and uninhabited. Here, oh Neoptolemus, son of Achilles, one brought 
up by the man who is mightiest among Greeks, that I exposed at some 
time Poeas’ son, from Malis, being appointed to do so by the rulers, 
because his foot was dripping with the disease that was eating through it. 
We could attempt neither libation nor burnt sacrifice without hindrance, 
but he was continually filling the camp with his savage curses, shrieking, 
moaning.87 
Philoctetes is defined here as an other—a man who has become a strange, 
unruly and bothersome beast. Expressed by Sophocles directly from the first 
lines, his alienation is represented through an analogy with the desolate 
surroundings of the exposed sick man. The reason for his desolation is the fact 
that Philoctetes does not allow the others to carry on with their usual activities: 
“ὅτ᾽ οὔτε λοιβῆς ἡµὶν οὔτε θυµάτων παρῆν ἑκήλοις προσθιγεῖν”88 (“we could not 
attempt neither libation nor burnt sacrifice without hindrance”). Disease takes 
over the whole life of the hero, his behavior is transformed, as he is reduced to a 
shrieking, irritating being who gets in the way of others. In fact, there is a 
synecdochic relationship between pain and man: his usual surroundings, 
actions, his range of motion and most importantly, his agency, are all reduced to 
here and now, by pain and the inarticulate expression of it. 
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Philoctetes’ isolation on Lemnos as Rush Rehm shows in his essay The 
Play of Space: Spatial Transformation in Greek tragedy, is similar to the 
experience of a patient who is hospitalized, an experience that amplifies 
isolation. The hospitalized person, just like Philoctetes, is removed from the 
community; his clothes, through which he is connected to society, are taken 
away. To come back to the aforementioned mind-body opposition which ceases 
to exist when pain takes over: Philoctetes is not capable of transcending his 
body, even when he wants to do so; he cannot control or contain the suffering. 
His whole being becomes an expression of pain. It is almost as if pain were an 
entity that takes over the hero’s body, a demon that possesses it. In these 
opening lines, the vulnerability of the sufferer becomes apparent: the others 
cannot and do not empathize with Philoctetes because firstly—it is not possible 
to truly understand another’s suffering and secondly—because they can no 
longer participate in life; and life must keep unfolding. The verbs that describe 
Philoctetes’ behavior (βοῶν, στενάζων—shrieking, moaning), as well as the very 
concrete and almost shocking mention, in line seven, of the cause of pain (νόσῳ 
καταστάζοντα διαβόρῳ πόδα—his foot was dripping with the disease that was 
eating through it), make clear the fact that Philoctetes has stopped behaving in 
accordance with the laws of society because of his pain. He is entirely isolated. 
This is what Leder calls “an epistemic block”—a wall that is erected between 
sufferer and family, friends and the community, when pain intervenes. This gap 
created between the sufferer and the world can only be solved by someone who 
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takes the role of healer: someone who listens, understands and tolerates the 
suffering; someone who makes sense of the inaccurate language used by the 
sufferer to explain his disease and to express his pain. 
The following passage starts at line 1081, after Philoctetes had his bow 
stolen. He previously refused to follow Odysseus and Neoptolemus to Troy 
because the one rule that Philoctetes abides by, even while suffering greatly, is 
the one according to which his friends are worthy of praise, while his enemies of 
hatred and revenge. Philoctetes addresses his place of dwelling directly, in 
language that seems to be consoling, while emphasizing his own desolation, 
through the association between the bleakness of the place, his disease and his 
lack of agency, resulting from the fact that his bow, his only valuable belonging, 
had been stolen earlier. 
Philoctetes 
Oh, hollow in the cavernous rock, hot (in summer) and icy cold (in 
winter), so I was not, after all, going to leave you, never, wretch that I 
am, but you will be conscious of me also (as I am) dying! Ah, me, me! Oh 
dwelling much filled with pain, the pain coming from wretched me. What 
will be for me daily? What hope associated with the provisions of food, 
from where, will I, wretched, meet with?89 
One sentence in particular stands out in the above-quoted passage: “λλά µοι καὶ 
θνῄσκοντι συνείσει” (but you will be conscious of me also (as I am) dying!). As in a 
hospital, where most people spend their last days, Philoctetes is assuming that 
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his end will come on the island of Lemnos, where he spent most of his sick days. 
The following two verses strengthen this analogy: “ὦ πληρέστατον αὔλιον λύπας 
τᾶς  π᾽ ἐµοῦ τάλαν “(Oh, dwelling much filled with pain, the pain coming from 
wretched me). The island, Philoctetes feels, in filled with pain, which comes 
from himself, since his pain existed before he arrived in Lemnos. The island, 
however, has become like him, even part of him, through the transference of 
pain; now it is a place associated with disease and suffering, just like a hospital. 
Lemnos reflects the patient’s state of mind (and body). In the following passage, 
which comes at the end of the play, after Heracles has commanded him to follow 
Neoptolemus and Odysseus to Troy, where he will be cured of his disease, 
Philoctetes turns again towards Lemnos, his place of suffering and 
transformation: 
Philoctetes 
Come now, let me call to this land as I depart. Farewell, oh house that 
shared watch with me. Farewell, nymphs living in the waters and the 
meadows, and the male pounding of the sea against the promontory, 
where often in the recess (of the cave), my head was wetted by the south 
wind’s blasts, and where many times Mt. Hermaion mount sent me, in 
my suffering, a groaning lament in response to my voice’s groaning 
lament. But now, oh you clear springs and Lycian water, we are leaving 
you, leaving you indeed, never having entered on this belief! Farewell, 
sea-surrounded land of Lemnos, and send me on a fair voyage without 
blame, send me to the destination that mighty Fate appoints and the will 
of my friends, and by the all-subduing god who has accomplished these 
things.90 
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The imagery used to describe Lemnos this time belongs to the surrounding 
nature. These aspects have not been mentioned in the play until the end. 
Lemnos is, up to this point, a place laden with pain. The emotional farewell, 
emphasized by the repetition in “λείποµεν ὑµᾶς, λείποµεν ἤδη” (“we are leaving 
you, leaving you indeed”) shows that suffering does, in fact, help create 
connections. Here, Lemnos is almost anthropomorphized, or at least animated 
by lively nymphs, winds and waters, in constant movement, whereas before it 
was the place where Philoctetes dwelled in pain, barely able to provide for 
himself. Among the different methods of employing language in order to depict 
the hero’s state of pain in this play is the employment of the physical space, 
which changes in accordance with his suffering. Gaston Bachelard, a twentieth 
century French phenomenologist, writes in The Poetics of Space, that a place of 
dwelling, a home, is altered by the imagination (and in the case of Philoctetes, 
by his suffering) of the dweller: 
All really inhabited space bears the essence of the notion of home. In the 
course of this work, we shall see that the imagination functions in this 
direction whenever the human being has found the slightest shelter: we 
shall see the imagination build “walls” of improbable shadows, comfort 
itself with the illusion of protection—or, just the contrary, tremble behind 
thick walls, mistrust the staunchest ramparts. In short, in the most 
interminable of dialectics, the sheltered being gives perceptible limits to 
his shelter. He experiences the house in its reality and in its virtuality, by 
means of thought and dreams.91 
Therefore, if Lemnos is the house of Philoctetes’ suffering, the reader or 
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spectator can assess the state of the hero also by paying attention to the 
description of his physical surroundings. From the interior of the two-mouthed 
cave, harsh, either too cold or too hot, where the hero is stuck most of the time 
when he is in intense pain, to the outside, as described in the above-quoted 
passage—the dialectics of inside and outside—a dichotomy inherent to 
phenomenology, show that pain and suffering are expressed in a multitude of 
ways in ancient tragedy.  
  3.2.2 The Limits of Language 
Building towards a theory of pain, Elaine Scarry argues that the 
experience of pain escapes language, abandoning the victim confused and muted 
by its incommunicability. Her argument is based on the assertion that language 
is destroyed by pain: the experience is forceful and words fail as soon as one is 
exposed to that kind of experience. It is impossible, according to her, to find a 
manner of expressing pain that accurately articulates its severity. As Scarry 
puts it: “physical pain does not simply resist language but actively destroys it, 
bringing about an immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to the 
sounds and cries a human being makes before language is learned.” There are 
multiple examples of this process of reversion in Philoctetes, but the episode 
where there is both a focus on the sounds and cries starts at line 732. Scarry 
draws on this particular example in her book: 
[T]hus Sophocles’s agonized Philoctetes utters a cascade of changing cries 
and shrieks that in the original Greek are accommodated by an array of 
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formal words (some of them twelve syllables long), but that at least one 
translator found could only be rendered in English by the uniform 
syllable “Ah” followed by variations in punctuation (Ah! Ah!!!!). But even 
if one were to enumerate many additional examples, such cultural 
differences, taken collectively, would themselves constitute only a very 
narrow margin of variation and would thus in the end work to expose and 
confirm the universal sameness of the central problem, a problem that 
originates much less in the inflexibility of any one language or in the 
shyness of any one culture than in the utter rigidity of pain itself: its 
resistance to language is not simply one of its incidental or accidental 
attributes but is essential to what it is.92 
The passage Scarry refers to is the following one: 
Philoctetes: Ai, ai! 
Neoptolemus: What is it? 
Philoctetes: Nothing terrible, but go ahead, oh child. 
Neoptolemus: Is it pain from the disease that is (constantly) affecting 
you? 
Philoctetes: No, indeed, not at all. But just now I think I feel relief. Oh, 
Gods! 
Neoptolemus: Why do you call the gods, groaning thus? 
Philoctetes: That they may come as saviours and kind towards us. Ai! 
Ai! 
Neoptolemus: What is happening to you? Speak, do not keep so silent. It 
is evident that that you are suffering in some way. 
Philoctetes: I am destroyed, boy, I can never conceal my suffering when 
you are close. Ah! Ah! It goes through me, goes through! Oh, the pain, the 
misery! I am destroyed, child, I am consumed! Aiaiaiaiaiai! Ah, by the 
gods, child, I beg you, if you have a sword ready to hand, strike the top of 
my foot, cut it off right away! Do not spare my life! Go ahead, child! 
Neoptolemus: What has come on you thus suddenly new in regard to 
which you make so much howling and groaning over yourself? 
Philoctetes: You know, oh child. 
Neoptolemus: What is it? 
Philoctetes: You know, boy. 
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Neoptolemus: What ails you? I do not know. 
Philoctetes: How do you not know? Aiaiaiaiai! 
Neoptolemus: Yes, terrible is the burden of the disease. 
Philoctetes: Terrible that cannot be spoken! Oh, have pity upon me!93 
Here, exposing the inexpressibility of pain is at the core of this text, since 
Philoctetes cannot even respond to Neoptolemus’ questions, (for example: “τί 
τοὺς θεοὺς ὧδ᾽ ναστένων καλεῖς;”—”Why do you call the gods, groaning thus?”). 
Philoctetes experiences a complete disconnection from any cognitive process 
that could help him explain or narrate his experience. Neoptolemus is forced, 
thus, to remain outside of the suffering and that causes, again, an extreme 
alienation between the sufferer and anyone who could offer compassion (which 
means, literally, “to suffer with”). While the disease is “δεινὸν γὰρ οὐδὲ ῥητόν” 
(“terrible that it cannot be told”), a story of pain is still told, albeit through 
inarticulate shrieks and phrases that are outside of the customary realm, like 
Philoctetes’ pleads to have his ankle cut off. A shift occurs here between spheres 
of language: although the language is not accurate, it does express something 
for the hermeneut, for the one who has the inclination, training or time to listen 
and make sense of it.  
 In Philoctetes, the vocabulary for pain is not extensive (“ἄλγος” is used 
mainly) and Sophocles uses approximations quite often (for example he uses 
“νόσηµα”, disease, to express the pain that Philoctetes feels). However, it is 
important to mention that in Greek, there are several words for pain, each with 
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a different connotation: λύπη, which is the most concrete use, meaning “pain in 
the body,” ἀνία, meaning “sorrow, distress, trouble” and ἄχος, “pain, distress” 
used to express mental anguish, but also physical suffering94. These facets of 
pain also have their corresponding daimons. 
To make use of an analogy—deciphering the language of pain is like 
interpreting signs, giving sense to the incomprehensible. In the ancient Greek 
context, interpreting the language of pain is quite natural. The Greek 
vocabulary of the body is defined by multiplicity, even when expressed in its 
entirety. Words used for body parts (for example καρδία - heart, πρόσωπον- face) 
are used with a metonymic value: a part for the whole. The close relationship of 
dependency between the physical and the psychological is done within an 
intention that absorbs the body parts within itself.95 This vocabulary, then, 
constitutes a code that allowed the Greeks to express and think about their 
relationship with themselves, but also their relationship with the others. It also 
expresses the relationship with the divine, with the gods, the ones that 
Philoctetes calls to in the midst of his fits of pain, the gods who, should not be 
forgotten, have a physical body as well, even though it is one that does not die 
and does not suffer. Therefore, this symbolic system represented through 
language and body parts is marked by the signs of limitation, deficiency, 
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disease, a perishable body; one that reminds humans, especially through 
suffering, that they are inferior to the divine super-body. 
3.2.4 Trachiniae: Pain and Death by Centaur 
When pain does not close the sufferer inside his own body or in an eremitic 
space, when the hero in pain is not silenced by pain or reduced to a shrieking 
creature, he is exposed through pain with all his defining traits and passions 
amplified. Such is the case with Heracles in the Trachiniae, where he meets his 
end by wearing the poisoned cloak sent him by his wife, Deianira. The cloak is 
sent as a gift before the completion of his nostos, but the jealous Deianira adds 
onto it an ointment made from the clotted blood of Nessus, the lustful centaur 
killed by Heracles because, while carrying her across a stream, he made an 
offensive advance (“ψαύει µαταίαις χερσίν”96—”he touched her with indecent 
hands”). Nessus deceitfully advised Deianira to store the blood accumulating 
around his wound and give it to Heracles in case of urgent need of a love charm 
because “ἔσται φρενός σοι τοῦτο κηλητήριον/ τῆς Ἡρακλείας, ὥστε µήτιν᾽ εἰσιδὼν/ 
στέρξει γυναῖκα κεῖνος ἀντὶ σοῦ πλέον”97 (“and this will be a love-charm for the 
heart of Heracles, so that he will not ever love anyone he looks on more than 
you”). The time has arrived when such a charm would be useful, since Heracles 
has fallen in love and even send home his new mistress, the beautiful Iole, 
before arriving back to Trachis himself. Deianira anxiously hatches a plan to get 
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the ointment, by means of a cloak, to Heracles, who is at the time on the island 
of Euboea, celebrating his conquest over the city Oechalia (Iole’s home city). The 
ointment is in fact a deadly poison; Heracles is in focus as a character only after 
the contact with the poison. Cypris is deeply involved in all of this—she is 
mentioned by the Chorus several times (497-506, 860)—as this is a play of 
soaring passions. When pain appears in the equation, at 765, the spirits have 
already been lit by what has transpired in Heracles’ absence. The moment of 
contact with the cloak is a valuable one to look at, since Heracles’ first reaction 
when exposed to pain is significant for what follows in the play: 
At first - oh wretched man! - he prayed in calm 
of mind, rejoicing in his lovely garment; 
but when the gory flame began to blaze  
up from the offerings on the sappy pine, 
sweat covered all his body, and the robe 
clung to his sides as if glued by a craftsman 
to every joint; and from his very bones 
shot up spasmodic, stinging pangs: the poison, 
like some detested, bloody snake’s, devoured him. 
Then he cried out aloud for ill-starred Lichas, 
who was in no way guilty of your crime, 
to ask what treachery made him bring the robe; 
but he, unlucky man! knew not, and answered 
he had but brought the gift which you had given. 
When Heracles heard this a penetrating 
convulsive spasm clutched his lungs, and he 
seized Lichas where the ankle joins the foot 
and dashed him on a rock swept by the sea 
so that the white brain seeped among his hairs, 
and all his shattered skull was bloodied over.98 
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Firstly, the dramatic transition from Heracles’ calm state of mind just before a 
sacrifice (however ironic that juxtaposition may seem) to the state of pain, with 
all the physical signs, seen by Hyllus, his son (the above-quoted passage is in a 
longer accusatory monologue that Hyllus addresses to Denaira) is remarkable 
style-wise. Sophocles builds up the moment of contact with pain and the impact 
is quite effective. The pain is announced by the “φλὸξ” (flame) and the first sign 
of pain are “ἱδρὼς ἀνῄει χρωτί” (sweat rolled over all his skin). Until here, the 
language describing pain is the same one used to describe love. As the poison 
starts to take effect, the words used by Hyllus to depict Heracles’ agony stay in 
the same semantic field: “προσπτύσσεται πλευραῖσιν ἀρτίκολλος” (the close-fitting 
robe embraced his sides), he is shaken by “ἀδαγµὸς ἀντίσπαστος” (spasmodic 
pain), and, the cluster of images and references “εἶτα φοινίας ἐχθρᾶς ἐχίδνης ἰὸς ὣς 
ἐδαίνυτο” (then the poison feasted on him like that of a hated viper’s). The viper 
reference sends to Hydra, whose killing by Heracles constitutes one of his 
labours. The Hydra is also referenced at 573-4, when Nessus explains that 
Heracles’ arrow, which is killing him, is dipped in Hydra’s poisonous blood. As 
Deianira gathers the blood around the wound, which makes its way to Heracles 
to poison him, it seems that the circularity of the narrative is indicating that 
Heracles is given his due, while Deianira is only an intermediary in a greater 
design. Heracles is Zeus’ son, a demi-god (deified after death) and under 
constant watch by the gods, but here the workings of ananke are always in the 
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background of the plot. Nor is Lichas guilty of any crime, as Hyllus points out, 
but Heracles’ pain is externalized and directed at him. Lichas’ gory death 
foreshadows the ending of the play and the way Heracles’ pain is manifested 
subsequently.  
 Heracles feels pain just like the other tragic characters—he is weakened, 
exposed and made vulnerable just like Philoctetes and Prometheus. In fact, his 
experience of pain is even more humiliating than that of Philoctetes seen in 
light of the heroic greatness of his past, coming after the onerous toils that he 
had to endure; he is reduced to a powerless, whimpering or groaning creature 
and, most disgracing of all, resembling a girl: 
Go, child, be bold! And pity me, for I 
am pitiful indeed as I lie sobbing 
and moaning like a virgin! No one living 
has ever seen me act like this before; 
for I have never groaned at my misfortunes 
till now, when I have proved myself a woman.99 
Before the moment of pain and death depicted in the Trachiniae, Heracles had 
put a lot of effort into to proving himself to be a virile demi-god, the true son of 
Zeus. It is, therefore, ironic and not accidental that in his pain and death he 
would be shown in his most defenseless, weak posture, which he is, in fact, 
trying to counter by becoming more and more tyrannical. It is also not 
accidental that the first time we take account of Heracles, as he comes into the 
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play as a character, he is unconscious, then, waking up, realizes the agony he is 
in, desires to die in order to end it—these are all reactions to pain that are 
within the range of typical behaviour. However, as the pain intensifies, Heracles 
shows a vicious, bestial side. Penelope Biggs argues in her essay The Disease 
Theme in Sophocles that Heracles’ agony is defined by his lecherous nature, 
which is intensified by disease:     
The disease of Heracles represents the intensification of the lust inherent 
in his nature; this meaning is correlated throughout with the “half-beast” 
imagery of the play, and shortly after this passage we have the mention 
of Nessus (555ff.), as if to reinforce the picture of Achelous. Nessus, who 
was not fighting for Deianeira on the honourable level of the marriage 
contest, is always ho thēr to her and to the chorus (556, 568, 662, 680, 
707, 935); but later on we are reminded that the centaurs too are “double-
natured” (1095). By the end of the play Nessus has poetically executed 
Heracles for the lust which had cost him his life at Heracles’ hands. From 
victory over bull-god and centaur to hideous death in the poisoned robe is’ 
all too short a step, as short as that which in the chorus’ minds separates 
the winning of Deianeira from the capture of Iole.100 
Biggs’ reading is accurate, but if we consider the other elements of the story (the 
fact that Heracles dies by his own poison or the reason of his death, which is his 
lust for Iole that prompts Deianira to send him the toxic ointment), Heracles 
becomes the “half-beast,” while the cloak, an extension of his own body, turns 
against him. This, Heracles does not recognize, as he is blaming Deianira for his 
agony, but his words describe that which inflicts pain, the poisonous cloak, as 
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both outside and inside his body, taking over his entire organism:  
Glued to my sides, it eats my flesh away 
deep down within, and dwells inside my lungs 
choking my breath: already it has drunk 
my fresh warm blood and wasted my whole body, 
binding me with unutterable chains. 
And yet, no spearman on the battlefield, 
no earth-born troop of Giants, no wild beast, 
nor Greece, nor any foreign land which I 
purged in my wanderings, could do this to me! 
   A woman - weak, not masculine by nature – 
alone, without a sword, has vanquished me!101         
That which was supposed to enflame Heracles’ desire, the “κηλητήριον” (love-
charm) falsely prescribed by Nessus, ends up killing him; the language used to 
describe it can also be, once more, the language of Eros. The great hero of the 
Greek world has apparently been destroyed by a woman, not in battle, as it 
would have been honourable. The duality is inherent in Heracles’ persona, as it 
is in his fate and his pain. His agony exposes the contrasts represented in the 
last third of the play as extreme. Pain, in this case, takes the hero to the limits 
of his character, disclosing his egomania through a long psychosis that ends in a 
ritual of burning him alive—perhaps a purifying flaming, that frees Heracles of 
the burden of his ego.       
In all three plays discussed above I have shown how pain can expose and 
actualize through both setting and forcing limits. Aeschylus and Sophocles were 
aware of the power pain held and used it to reveal that which cannot be 
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expressed by means of the celebrated myths, which were well-known narratives 
in classical Greece. Rather, by using the myths everyone was familiar with and 
adding the testing element (the extreme contingency, the pain) and by putting 
emphasis, thus, on ananke, the poets were the emissaries of a different kind of 
teaching, perhaps an esoteric one. The exposure to pain is not done in tragedy, 
as I have emphasized before, as a manner of transcending the physical and 
connecting to the divine. Instead, pain in tragedy appears to work like a healing 
method, but not a healing in mundane terms; rather, the healing seems to be 
that of a spiritual type, which actualizes and sets one in the present, baring him 
of all extensions, pretence, covers, tricks and braveries. When confronting pain, 
the tragic characters are naked and the poets want the public to see their heroes 
in this condition. 
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Conclusion and Further Considerations 
I chose these three plays only for their textual treatment of pain, the 
palpable presentation of the circumstances of pain and the interconnectedness 
of the three characters in myth and tragedy. Heracles, for example, is Io’s heir, 
the one who will eventually free Prometheus, as Prometheus himself announces 
in his prophecy, in a dialogue with the Chorus.102 Moreover, Philoctetes carries 
Heracles’ bow, given to him when he is the only one who accepts to light the 
pyre, burning and releasing Heracles from the suffering caused by the poisonous 
cloak, as depicted in the Trachiniae. One line of interpretation here, which could 
prove valuable in a future study, but does not fit confines of the argument in 
this thesis, is that pain is thus transferred from Heracles to Philoctetes through 
the bow—the only valuable belonging that Philotetes has and relies on in his 
isolation on the island of Lemnos. These three heroes, all men, all virile 
warriors, have in common their exposed vulnerability. Tragedy, by using 
mythological variants, challenges mythological archetypes and in these three 
plays I am arguing that it does so by exposing the heroes to the experience of 
pain. There are several women figures in tragedy that I would like to look at in 
relation to pain in a future study, such as Cassandra in Aeschylus’ 
Agammemnon, and Io in Prometheus Bound. Also, in Sophocles’ extant plays, 
Antigone is a figure of suffering and anguish, who struggles against an unjust 
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political authority, Jocasta in Oedipus Rex, as well as Electra. Although I am 
arguing, in the introduction to this thesis, for the exclusion of Euripides from a 
study of ancient pain, I do think that his plays are not utterly contaminated by 
Aristotle’s advancement of plot and character as dominating concepts and I 
would like, in the future, to do a thorough analysis of several plays, such as 
Medea, Hipollytus and Andromache, where pain and suffering play a central 
role. In relation to this aspect, what this study lacks is a thorough textual 
analysis and a layer of gender theory that I am gesturing towards, but not 
addressing directly. As I explain in the introduction, I am choosing to focus here 
on discourse analysis, using this methodology to clean the slate for a fresher 
analysis, devoid of elements of dualism and Aristotelian categorization, which 
cloud a modern reception of tragedy. I am also wary of adding another layer of 
discourse on the ancient texts, one that is not necessarily compatible with the 
tragic sphere. For this reason, I am only suggesting and pointing to the gender 
aspects of these plays presently. I do think, however, that gender theories can 
add a dimension to a study of pain in tragedy that would open discourse and 
generate a productive discussion. Judith Butler’s book Antigone’s Claim: 
Kinship between Life and Death is a good example of how gender studies can aid 
a discussion of tragic figures. In my case, I would still like to focus, in any 
related future study, on the nucleus of pain in tragedy, as a notion of limit and 
on deconstructing any conceptual system before using it as lens for analysis.  
Another aspect that I excluded here, one that is essential for a study of 
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pain, is that of the performance. This is perhaps the most problematic choice I 
had to make due to the space and time restriction. While many times I refer to 
the role of the spectator in tragedy, especially in relation to Aristotle’s concepts, 
this is never thoroughly discussed in this thesis. One of the reasons for my 
choice is the fact that performance aspects in classical scholarship are mostly 
based on textual references and assumptive contextualization, meaning that we 
do not have access to concrete evidence that can ground studies of performance 
of Attic tragedy. However, there are many valuable studies that do explore the 
dynamics of performance and that advance compelling arguments. For example, 
David Wiles’ work Mask and Performance in Greek Tragedy: From Ancient 
Festival to Modern Experimentation looks at performance in relation to ritual by 
considering the social and religious context of the tragedies. Wiles advances the 
idea that the mask is an instrument of disguising and manipulating the gaze, as 
well as playing an important role in the relation between actor and public. He 
uses, for his study, archaeological evidence, as well as anthropological 
assessment and textual confirmation. For a study of performance based mainly 
on textual evidence and, more specifically, on the analysis of prosody in Greek 
poetry, A. P. David’s book The Dance of the Muses: Choral Theory and Ancient 
Greek Poetics is a valuable source. David develops a theory of accent, linking 
poetry to performance, more precisely to dance. He explains the purpose of his 
study thus: 
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[T]he phenomenon of agreement, between metrical ictus and word-level 
accent, leads us via a historical sourcing of this ictus, not, as in English, 
in an automatic linguistic pattern of prosodic alternation, but in the 
documented extra-linguistic phenomenon of dance, to the synthetic notion 
of choreia (χορεία). Analysed by Plato into its elements of ‘rhythm’ and 
‘harmony’, χορεία becomes a rubric under which to contextualize and 
exploit the new theory of the accent. Accent corresponds to harmony and 
ictus to rhythm. We shall see that χορεία is a concept that opens new 
approaches, radically new and yet radically authentic, into the poetics of 
ancient poetry.103 
This study is a good example of language-based scholarship that leads to 
performance studies related to Greek tragedy. By strengthening the link 
between metrics and χορεία, David advances the possibility of studying the 
ritualistic aspect of performance in tragedy.  
 Oliver Taplin’s book Greek Tragedy in Action provides a compelling 
introduction to the universe of tragic performance104. Taplin argues that, in 
spite of the shift of focus in the last decades from written word to the 
performance of Greek theatre, both of them are important. This book is written 
for a larger public rather than for a specialized one, so it is mostly concerned 
with introducing aspects of performance, while relating them to text. The 
author does not, however, go into much depth when introducing key concepts, 
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such as emotions, representation and the chorus.  
 Two other studies that are worth mentioning here focus on the space of 
performance, which I briefly commented on in the third chapter of this thesis, in 
relation to the eremitic place of suffering in Prometheus Bound and Philoctetes. 
These two works, however, go further with their study of space in Greek 
tragedy, examining the space of performance and its implications. Graham Ley, 
in The Theatricality of Greek Tragedy: Playing Space and Chorus addresses the 
playing space “by working backwards from textual evidence, practical 
implications of the surviving scripts and often on those forms of research that 
have been conducted practically.”105 He further notes that “[i]n order to 
appreciate the kind of theater that Greek tragedy was, we need to understand 
the conditions for which the scripts were composed, and (…) to do that we need 
to work substantially in reverse, from the scripts to the conditions for which 
they were composed.”106 The other aspect that Ley comments on in his book is 
that of the chorus, although he is careful to mention that his study of the chorus 
is one based on different “proposals” and performance theories that have been 
advanced in the past “because [a study of the chorus] involves questions of 
music and dancing and our own cultural puzzlement over this kind of 
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performance for which we have no real equivalent.”107  
The second work focusing on spatiality in Greek tragedy is Rush Rehm’s 
The Play of Space: Spatial Transformation in Greek Tragedy. Rehm defines his 
method of study as “spatial semiotics,”108 defining his position against 
structuralist readings of space in tragedy, where binaries (such as 
inside/outside, masculine/feminine space distinctions) are prevalent. This is a 
compelling study, which brings up, from the beginning, the questions of 
ambiguity in interpretation, metaphoric implications of treating space as an 
extension of the self, essentialism and positivism. Based on my own research, 
this work seems to be one of the most thorough and involved studies of space in 
tragedy. I would like to use these works as a starting point for an analysis of 
pain in relation to performance in Greek tragedy in the future. One of the 
pressing issues that should be treated in a further study on this subject is that 
of representation and form in relation to pain. In deconstructing Aristotle’s 
mimetic system in the first chapter of this thesis, I did not advance a theory of 
representation of my own. Nor did I, however, discard this issue. I simply chose 
to focus, in this thesis, on discourse patterns that interfere with a potential 
analysis of pain and representation. This does not mean that I am not 
acknowledging that structure and form are essential components of tragedy and 
                                                
107 Ley, Theatricality, ix. 
108 Rush Rehm, The Play of Space: Spatial Transformation in Greek Tragedy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 1. 
108 
 
pain does split structures, but it is also contained by them. Greek tragedy relies 
on representation, but my study here advances solely the idea that Aristotle’s 
mimesis does not provide the tools for analysis that would be compatible with 
the tragic sphere. A future analysis of representation and pain would include 
elements of performance, such as the stage, music, metrics, the mask, the 
chorus and the public, all of which play an important role in the tragic realms 
and, specifically, in relation to pain.  
Moreover, it would be necessary to include several other approaches in 
order to nuance an analysis of pain and contextualize it more accurately. One 
such frame of reference would be that of ancient medicine, with a focus on 
diagnostics. The approach to pain and the body in the ancient context, as I have 
discussed, is fundamentally different and not affected by Plato’s dualism, nor by 
Christianity’s rendering of the body in opposition to the soul and to God. As 
Aristotle approaches tragedy with the intention of cleansing it of its rawness by 
applying the mimetic model as an analgesic formula, ancient medicine works to 
cure and alleviate pain, but it does so through a system that does not hide the 
pain and the body. This would expose a facet of the Greek culture that would 
reveal the way in which pain would have affected the spectator and whether 
catharsis was indeed a purgation of sorts or rather a different kind of experience 
that the Greeks were familiar with.  
Another axis of analysis that was left out here due to lack of space was 
the connection between pain in tragedy and pleasure. Without going so far as to 
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adopt a psychoanalytic approach, a process of hermeneutical analysis would be 
useful in determining whether on the other side of the threshold of pain there is 
at least a hint of ecstasy. This aspect could help in testing the grounds for an 
interpretation of catharsis, without using it as an intermediating concept in the 
education of emotional purgation of the public. In relation to this and by linking 
tragedy, through pain, with the ritualistic context, an exploration of the possible 
spiritual influences in tragedies could be a compelling axis of research.  
Overall, this hard-to-contain project reflects the nature of pain itself, as I 
see it: breaking through constructs reveals a world that, through the painful 
splitting of patterns, bares a profoundly human vulnerability which inheres in 
both life and in tragedy. 
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